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Abstract
There is an interaction effect between cross sectional variation in individual stock investor sentiment and a
broad set of financial market anomalies. An average anomaly strategy earns higher (lower) 3-factor alpha
conditioned on higher (lower) individual stock investor sentiment. This is mainly driven by the very negative
alpha of the high sentiment conditioned short leg of each anomaly. Consequently, buying the low sentiment
long leg of each anomaly and shorting the high sentiment short leg of each anomaly yields 0.434% to 0.474%
more in monthly three-factor alpha than an unconditional anomaly strategy on average. In contrast, buying
the high sentiment long leg of each anomaly and shorting the low sentiment short leg of each anomaly result
in no alpha on average.
I present novel evidence that the financial market anomalies are mispricings: firms act as arbitrageurs and tend
to issue shares if they are in the short leg of an anomaly. In contrast, firms tend to repurchase shares and/or
pay cash dividends if they are in the long leg of an anomaly. Individual stock investor sentiment exaggerates
these effects. In particular, firms in the high sentiment short leg of anomalies trade equity ownership for cash
or services (e.g. issuance of shares) while firms in the low sentiment long leg of anomalies pay or trade cash for
equity ownership (e.g. cash dividends). The difference, measured using the Daniel and Titman (2006)
composite issuance measure, is on average 0.535% to 0.632% per month. This is stronger than the
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ABSTRACT
INDIVIDUAL STOCK INVESTOR SENTIMENT, STOCK ISSUANCE, AND
FINANCIAL MARKET ANOMALIES
Edmund Pak Kuen Lee
Donald B. Keim
There is an interaction e¤ect between cross sectional variation in individual stock
investor sentiment and a broad set of nancial market anomalies. An average anomaly
strategy earns higher (lower) 3-factor alpha conditioned on higher (lower) individual
stock investor sentiment. This is mainly driven by the very negative alpha of the
high sentiment conditioned short leg of each anomaly. Consequently, buying the
low sentiment long leg of each anomaly and shorting the high sentiment short leg of
each anomaly yields 0.434% to 0.474% more in monthly three-factor alpha than an
unconditional anomaly strategy on average. In contrast, buying the high sentiment
long leg of each anomaly and shorting the low sentiment short leg of each anomaly
result in no alpha on average.
I present novel evidence that the nancial market anomalies are mispricings: rms
act as arbitrageurs and tend to issue shares if they are in the short leg of an anomaly.
In contrast, rms tend to repurchase shares and/or pay cash dividends if they are
in the long leg of an anomaly. Individual stock investor sentiment exaggerates these
e¤ects. In particular, rms in the high sentiment short leg of anomalies trade equity
ownership for cash or services (e.g. issuance of shares) while rms in the low sentiment
long leg of anomalies pay or trade cash for equity ownership (e.g. cash dividends). The
di¤erence, measured using the Daniel and Titman (2006) composite issuance measure,
is on average 0.535% to 0.632% per month. This is stronger than the unconditional
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1 Introduction
Individual stock investor sentiment is a pervasive, yet elusive concept in asset pricing.
At any point in time, investors may be more bullish or bearish about one stock over
another based on reasons beyond rm fundamentals. There are many reasons why
this may happen. Psychological biases may induce individuals to make systematically
biased assessments about rms with certain characteristics. Heuristical limitations
like investor inattention may cause certain rms to be neglected. If these e¤ects a¤ect
enough investors, then there may be asset pricing implications in the presence of ar-
bitrage. The demand (or lack thereof) that these psychological biases and heuristical
limitations generate can be viewed generally as sentiment-induced positive or nega-
tive demand1. In this paper, I am agnostic about the underlying mechanism which
leads to the positive or negative sentiment shock. Instead, I look for measures that
proxy for individual stock investor sentiment broadly, independent of the particular
underlying cause.
Using these proxies, I explore the role that individual stock investor sentiment
plays in the abnormal returns across a broad set of nancial market anomalies. Fi-
nancial market anomalies can be dened as time series or cross sectional patterns in
returns that cannot be easily explained by classic nance theory based on risk and
return. Hence, they represent an interesting starting point to investigate the potential
role that an alternative paradigm based on investor sentiment and limits to arbitrage
may play in explaining observed patterns in returns. In this alternative paradigm,
psychological biases, heuristical limitations, or other factors may drive sentiment-
induced demand (or lack thereof) which pushes prices away from fundamental value.
Counteracting forces from arbitrageurs may be limited due to limited capacity of non-
1Negative demand can be viewed generally as an active shorting demand or a passive lack of
demand.
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diversied arbitrageurs to withstand idiosyncratic risks (Shleifer and Vishny (1997))
and short sale constraints. Consequently, prices may remain far from fundamental
value for protracted periods of time, and only converge gradually as the underly-
ing sentiment shock subsides. I focus on eleven well documented nancial market
anomalies in the cross section that cannot be explained by the standard Fama-French
three factor model. For each of the eleven anomalies, a long-short strategy based
on extreme quintile portfolios formed by sorting stocks on a variable of interest and
assigning them to ten portfolios earns Fama-French (1993) three factor alpha.
Previous behavioral approaches to explaining nancial market anomalies have
tried to link systematic investor psychological biases to the variables of interest, which
are usually rm characteristics. An implicit assumption in this approach is that such
investor biases a¤ect the cross-section of stocks which share the same levels of rm
characteristics uniformly. In particular, individual stocks which are in the same decile
or quintile of the variable of interest are on average a¤ected by psychological biases by
the same magnitude. This may not be the case. Here, I allow for the possibility that
even if, on average, a certain rm characteristic is associated with higher sentiment-
induced demand, there are rms which are less a¤ected and this can be deduced by
measuring individual stock investor sentiment directly.
Take the accrual anomaly as an example. Sloan (1996) conjectures that due
to limited attention, investors may overemphasize the total accounting earnings of
a rm, while neglecting incremental information from the cash ow component of
earnings. Consider rms that have the highest quintile levels of accrual. In the cross
section, some companies may be more explicit in making statements relating to the
high levels of accrual than others. For example, the management of a high accrual
rm may explicitly make earnings guidance that show mean reversion, citing sales
made on credit near the end of the quarter are typically orders that occur in the next
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quarter. If this is the case, investors are less likely to overreact to the high earnings
in the current quarter. In my framework, this would be a high accrual rm with
low individual stock investor sentiment. In this case, low subsequent returns are not
expected because the averagee¤ect of high accrual is mitigated by low individual
stock investor sentiment.
I now turn to the asset pricing implications. If individual stock investor senti-
ment is an important force in driving the return predictability of the nancial market
anomalies, it should be true that varying stock sentiment varies the magnitude and
signicance of the returns to each anomaly strategy. In particular, we should ex-
pect stronger positive Fama-French three factor alphas in the low individual stock
sentiment conditioned long quintile portfolios. On the other hand, we should expect
stronger negative Fama-French three factor alphas in the high individual stock sen-
timent conditioned short quintile portfolios. Furthermore, the relative di¢ culty of
short selling versus buying may limit the ability of rational traders to correct over-
pricing more so than underpricing. Hence, the e¤ect that high sentiment has on the
short leg of each anomaly is much greater than the e¤ect that low sentiment has on
the long leg of each anomaly. My results show that this is the case. On average,
buying the low sentiment long leg of each anomaly and shorting the high sentiment
short leg of each anomaly yields 0.434% to 0.474% more in Fama-French three factor
alpha than an unconditional anomaly strategy, depending on the proxy of sentiment.
This is mainly driven by the very negative alpha of the high-sentiment-conditioned
short leg of each anomaly, consistent with the notion that overpricing is more di¢ cult
to correct than underpricing. In contrast, buying the high sentiment long leg of each
anomaly and shorting the low sentiment short leg of each anomaly does not result in
signicant abnormal returns. This demonstrates the important role that individual
stock investor sentiment plays in nancial market anomalies.
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Next, I look at the phenomenon from the alternative viewpoint of arbitrageurs.
Traditionally, hedge funds and other professional money managers are seen as natural
candidates to ll the role of a rational arbitrageur. Here, I focus on the role of the
rm as a rational arbitrageur. If the spread in cross sectional returns generated by
buying the low sentiment conditioned long leg of anomalies and shorting the high
sentiment conditioned short leg of anomalies is not a proxy for an unspecied risk, I
expect that rms, being rational and informed agents, will respond to the mispricing
opportunistically. My results are consistent with such behavior. In fact, I show that
rms respond to the nancial market anomalies unconditionally, consistent with the
notion that the anomalies proxy for mispricing rather than an unspecied risk.
Intuitively, one can expect forces that limit arbitrage for professional managers to
be less severe for the company itself. Firstly, even though it may take time for a rm
to undertake a seasoned equity o¤ering, short sale constraints such as prohibitively
negative short rebate rates or the potential of short squeezes do not apply. The sce-
nario documented in Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and later experienced by Long Term
Capital Management, where delegated portfolio managers liquidate when mispricing
is the greatest, also does not apply. It is fair to say that limits to arbitrage are less se-
vere when the rm takes the role of a rational arbitrageur. For example, the manager
of a rm that undertakes a seasoned equity o¤ering at $50 only to see the stock rise
to $75 the following month is unlikely to be under any pressure from board members,
activist managers or individual investors for timing the market poorly. Indeed, such
management can easily excuse itself by pointing to the brilliant new projects being
undertaken using proceeds from the o¤ering as the main reasons for the increase in
stock price.
Thus, if rms are in the high sentiment short leg of anomalies, they will respond by
engaging in activities which trade equity ownership for cash or services (e.g. issuance
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of shares, stock acquisitions). This opportunistically takes advantage of the low cost of
equity a¤orded by sentiment-induced demand. On the other hand, if rms are in the
low sentiment long leg of anomalies, they will respond by engaging in activities which
pay or trade cash or services for equity ownership (e.g. cash dividends, repurchase
of shares). Activities which pay cash for equity ownership like paying cash dividends
can be viewed as a way for rm managers to signal to the market that the equity is
underpriced (e.g. Miller and Rock (1985)). The di¤erence, measured using the Daniel
and Titman (2006) composite issuance measure, is 0.535% to 0.632% per month.
These results largely a¢ rm the role of a rm as an arbitrageur. In this regard, I
provide a novel link between asset pricing anomalies and the issuance behavior of the
rm.
A closely related paper to mine is Stambaugh, Yu and Yuan (2012). They analyze
the asset pricing implications of time series investor sentiment and the same set
of nancial market anomalies. Other papers have looked at the e¤ect of turnover,
one of our proxies for individual stock investor sentiment, and anomalies. Lee and
Swaminathan (2000) analyze the e¤ect of turnover on price momentum. Hou, Peng
and Xiong (2009) analyze the e¤ect of turnover on post earnings announcement drift
and price momentum.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes my two
proxies for individual stock investor sentiment. Section 3 describes the eleven nan-
cial market anomalies I consider. Section 4 describes how the data is constructed.
Section 5 shows that there is an interaction e¤ect between cross sectional variation
in individual stock investor sentiment and the eleven nancial market anomalies I
consider. Section 6 describes my rst hypothesis ("Individual Stock Investor Sen-
timent Hypothesis") and shows the related results. Section 7 describes my second
hypothesis ("Firm as Arbitrageur Hypothesis") and shows the related results. Section
5
8 concludes.
2 Individual Stock Investor Sentiment
Individual stock investor sentiment can be broadly dened as optimism or pessimism
about a stock that is unrelated to projected cash ows or risk based information
about discount rates which leads to aggregate positive or negative demand shocks on
the particular stock2. In a classical nance theory setting, discount rates uctuate
due to information about the risk of the cash ow of a company and macroeconomic
risks. In this setting, discount rates may uctuate due to sentiment-induced demand
shocks. The attempt to measure and quantify individual stock investor sentiment is
to try to separate these two cases.
Such broad concept of sentiment does not take a view on whether the optimistic
or pessimisticbeliefs are driven by irrational beliefs about cash-ows or discount
rates or some higher-order-beliefs about other peoples optimism or pessimism that is
orthogonal to fundamentals. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) show that both types of
investors can co-exist for high sentiment stocks. During the two years leading up to
the peak of the technology bubble in 2000, a period of high sentiment for technology
stocks in general, hedge funds captured the upturn by overweighing the technology
sector but avoided much of the downturn by reducing their positions both ahead of
and during the decline. This shows that hedge fund managers are willing to buy stocks
at above fundamental value if they believe that the aggregate demand of irrational
investors is able to drive prices higher. However, it does appear that the existence of
2Baker and Wurgler (2006) broadly denes investor sentiment as proximity to speculate or
optimism or pessimism about stocks in general. Harrison and Kreps (1978) denes speculation
as follows: Investors exhibit speculative behavior if the right to resell a stock makes them willing
to pay more for it than they would pay if obliged to hold it forever.Hence, speculation are trades
that are not related to liquidity, tax-losses, or rebalancing needs.
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a sizable demand from irrational investors is a necessary condition. Otherwise, the
rationalhigher-order-beliefs about other peoples optimism or pessimism would be
false.
Although my approach of measuring stock sentiment is agnostic about the source
of such sentiment, such aggregate demand shocks may manifest themselves in proxies
that are both measurable and quantiable empirically. Baker and Wurgler (2006) use
the rst principal component of six sentiment related variables to quantify uctuation
of investor sentiment in the time series. Here, I identify variables related to investor
sentiment in the cross section: at any particular time, there may be more sentiment-
induced aggregate demand shocks on certain companies than others. A proxy which
can be used to measure individual stock investor sentiment need to fulll at least two
criteria. First, it needs to plausibly proxy for sentiment-induced positive or negative
demand. Second, a high measure of sentiment needs to predict low subsequent risk
adjusted average returns. In other words, high (low) sentiment corresponds to high
(low) prices. I describe my two measures of individual stock investor sentiment and
the rationale for choosing them below.
2.1 Turnover
The rst measure of individual stock investor sentiment is average monthly turnover.
Monthly turnover is the number of shares traded divided by total shares outstanding
of a particular stock in a particular month. My base case measure averages the
monthly turnover of 12 trailing months for each stock. Monthly turnover has the
literal meaning of being the average percentage of shares that is traded in a month.
Hence, it measures the intensity in which a xed oat of shares is being traded.
Historically, for the US equity market, high (low) trailing turnover in the time
series is associated with periods of high (low) stock sentiment. Baker and Wurgler
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(2006) use 5-year detrended annual market turnover as one of the six components
in constructing their index on time series sentiment. While some precision is lost in
measuring time series sentiment with only trailing aggregate turnover, it nonetheless
shows a remarkable 71% correlation with the sentiment index from 1965-2000. It is
also the only component of their index which can be easily adapted to analysis in the
cross section.
There is evidence that this correlation holds in the cross-section. Ofek and
Richardson (2003) empirically examine the dotcom mania and one of the salient fea-
tures of the episode is the high turnover of internet rms. They examine a total of 400
companies in pure Internet-related sectors and nd that during their sample period
from January 1998 to December 2000, the median daily share turnover of internet
stock is 1.25%, roughly 4 times higher than that of non-internet stocks, 0.34%. In
addition, the magnitude of this di¤erence in turnover likely underestimates the trad-
ing intensity of internet stocks, as a signicant number of shares were not allowed
to trade during the lockup period following these rms IPOs. Lamont and Thaler
(2003) empirically examine six equity carve-outs with unambiguously negative stub
prices in which the parent has stated its intention to promptly spin o¤ its remain-
ing shares of the subsidiary from April 1996 to August 2000. A negative stub price
represents a severe violation of law of one price: the subsidiary is traded at a higher
market value than the market value of the parents holding of the subsidiary. They
compute turnover3 for the rst 20 days of trading for both parent and subsidiary,
excluding the rst day of trading. The subsidiary has turnover that is more than ve
times that of parent turnover, with an average 37.8% of all tradable shares turning
over per day versus an average of 6.56% for the parent.
Earlier papers (e.g. Datar, Naik, Radcli¤e (1998)), which tend to interpret
3Turnover of subsidiary is computed by no. of shares traded/no. of shares sold to public in IPO.
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turnover as a proxy for liquidity, nd that high turnover in the cross section predicts
lower subsequent abnormal returns. Later papers provide evidence which cast doubts
on this interpretation. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) report cross-sectional Spear-
man rank correlations of trading turnover and relative spread of -0.12. Lamont and
Thaler (2003) show that even though the subsidiaries have ve times the turnover
of the parents in the case of equity carve-outs, there is no signicant di¤erence in
bid/ask spread between the parents and subsidiaries.
These results show that high turnover is associated with high prices (and hence
low subsequent returns) after correcting for rm characteristics in the cross section.
High turnover also appears to be a salient feature of investor optimism both in the
time series and cross section. These results provide ample empirical support for using
high turnover as a proxy for high sentiment.
There is also a growing number of theoretical papers which predicts high turnover
in high sentiment period. Harrison and Kreps (1978) wrote the rst dynamic model
which features trading and overpricing. They show that with short sale constraint and
heterogeneous expectations about dividend streams among di¤erent class of investors,
stock prices can be above the valuation of the most optimistic investor in a given
state. This occurs due to the option value of being able to sell to another investor
class in a state where the other investor class has a more bullish belief about the
value of the stock. While Harrison and Kreps (1978) are silent about the reason
why di¤erent investor classes disagree, Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) extend their
model to continuous time and model overcondence as a source of disagreement.
In doing so, they are able to explain the excessive turnover that tends to happen
in a bubble. They show that when agents are more overcondent about their own
signal, given a small transaction cost, the size of the bubble is larger and turnover
is also higher. Consistent with this hypothesis, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) use
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a comprehensive dataset from Finland to show that measures of overcondence are
positively related to trading activity. Baker and Stein (2004) suggest that turnover
can serve as a sentiment index. In the presence of short sales constraint, irrational
investors are more likely to trade when they are optimistic and betting on rising
stocks. This explains the correlation between turnover and prices. These theoretical
papers provide additional support for using turnover as a proxy for sentiment.
2.2 FL Flow
Frazzini and Lamont (2008) construct an individual stock investor sentiment variable
based on mutual fund ows. The variable, which I name FL Flow, is the increase
in mutual fund ownership in a stock that results from actual dollar ow exceeding
the amount that would have own to portfolio managers if they received ows pro-
portionate to their total net asset under management. In calculating the variable,
Frazzini and Lamont makes two assumptions. First, they assume that portfolio man-
agers do not alter their percentage allocated to di¤erent stocks given varying levels
of dollar ows. Second, they assume that stock prices are una¤ected by the buying
(selling) demand of the mutual fund sector. Intuitively, a large and positive FL Flow
for a stock means that the mutual funds which hold the stock are experiencing a
larger proportion of inow than their current market share of total net assets under
management in the mutual fund industry.
A simple example shows the basic intuition. Suppose at quarter 0, there are
two funds in the mutual fund industry: a social media fund with $10 billion in assets
under management and a value fund also with $10 billion in assets under management.
Suppose that at quarter 1, the mutual fund sector experienced a net inow of 2 billion.
Hence the counterfactual ow, which assumes inow proportionate to trailing assets
under management, would be 1 billion for each of the social media fund and value
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fund. In reality, the social media fund captured all of the inows while the value
fund did not experience any net ows. Suppose further that at quarter 1, the social
media fund held 1.2 billion worth of Facebook, while the value fund does not hold
any. Suppose further that Facebook is worth 12 billion. Hence the total mutual fund
industry holds 10% of Facebook. Also, the social media fund holds 10% of its portfolio
in Facebook. Counterfactually, if both funds experienced inows proportionate to
their previous total assets, then the social media fund would only have 11 billion in
assets. If it does not change its portfolio weights under the counterfactual ow, then
it would hold 1.1 billion worth of Facebook. Hence, if Facebook share price does not
change, then the mutual fund industry would hold 1.1/12=9.17% of Facebook. Hence,
the (one quarter) FL Flow for Facebook will be calculated as 10%-9.17%=0.83%.
This measure is interesting in that it infers individual stock investor sentiment
from measuring the active reallocation decision of individual investors, who are rela-
tively more likely to be inuenced by sentiment than professional investors. Hence, it
plausibly proxies for sentiment-induced positive or negative demand that is unrelated
to the fundamentals of the company. I leave the details of the construction of the
FL Flow variable in the Appendix. Following Frazzini and Lamont (2008), I use the
Three Year FL Flow as my proxy for individual stock investor sentiment.
3 Financial Market Anomalies
I explore eleven previously documented nancial market anomalies which earn positive
Fama and French (1993) 3-factor adjusted abnormal returns. This is the same set
of anomalies which Stambaugh, Yu, Yuan (2012) consider in a recent related paper
which explores the relationship between time series sentiment and the eleven nancial
market anomalies. Five of these anomalies are also examined in Fama and French
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(2008). I briey describe these anomalies below:
Anomaly 1 and 2: Accruals and Net Operating Assets
In any particular period, accounting earnings from continuing operations can be
separated into two components: the accrual component and the cash ow component.
A rudimentary example would be sales made on credit. While this increases account-
ing income, it does not impact cash ow- it is an accrual. Sloan (1996) conjectures
that investors may fail to distinguish between the accrual and cash ow components
of current earnings and naively only condition on overall earnings. In this case, if
the accrual component of earnings is less persistent than the cash ow component
of earnings, then high accruals would predict low future returns as investors overes-
timate the persistence of earnings of high accrual rms. Following Sloan (1996), I
measure accrual as follows:
Accrual =
(CA Cash)  (CL STD  TP ) Dep
Average Total Assets
(1)
where CA is the change in current asset (item ACT), Cash is the change
in cash/cash equivalents (item CHE), CL is the change in current liabilities (item
DLC), STD is the change in debt included in current liabilities (item LCT), TP
is the change in income taxes payable (item TXP), and Dep is depreciation and
amortization expenses (item DP). Average Total Assets is the average of the beginning
and end of year book value of total assets (item AT).
Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, Zhang (2004) denes a related concept. An accounting
identity states that:






Free Cash Flowt (2)
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Hence, Net Operating Asset is a cumulative measure of the deviation between
accounting value added and cash value added. Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, Zhang (2004)
conjecture that investors naively only condition on overall earnings in forming val-
uations of a rm. In this case, high net operating asset would predict low future
returns since investors overvalue the high accounting earnings in high net operating
asset rms. Similar to the accrual variable, net operating asset is scaled by lagged
total assets and is coded as follows:
Net Operating Asset =
Operating Assets   Operating Liabilities
Lagged Total Assets
(3)
where Operating Assets is dened as total assets (item AT) minus cash/cash
equivalents (item CHE). Operating Liabilities is dened as total assets (item AT)
minus short term debt (item DLC) minus long term debt (item DLTT) minus minority
interest (item MIB) minus preferred stock (item PSTK) minus common equity (item
CEQ). Note that there is a relationship between accrual and net operating assets.
Net operating assets can be restated as







Hence, Sloans accrual provides a single period ow measure of a component of
Net Operating Asset. As reported in Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, Zhang (2004), neither
e¤ect subsumes each other.
Anomaly 3 and Anomaly 4: Investment-to-Asset Growth and Asset Growth
Titman, Wei, Xie (2004) shows that rms which substantially increase capital
investments subsequently achieve negative abnormal returns. They conjecture this to
be due to investors tendency to ignore the negative information contained in a rms
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action to increase capital investment. Following Chen, Novy-Marx, Zhang (2011),
Stambaugh, Yu, Yuan (2012), I measure Investment-to-Asset as the annual change
in gross property, plant, and equipment (item PPEGT) plus the annual change in
inventories (item INVT) divided by the lagged book value of assets (item AT)4.
Cooper, Gulen, Schill (2008) expands on this notion of misvaluing growth. Instead
of looking at the growth of a component of a rms total investment activity, they look
at total asset growth. I follow Cooper, Gulen, Schill (2008) and measure asset growth
as the year-on-year percentage change in total assets (item AT). They interpret the
results as evidence that investors over-extrapolate past gains to growth.
Anomaly 5 and Anomaly 6: Net equity issues and composite issuance
There is a long history of papers which relates issuance, repurchase, and dividend
activities to cross sectional abnormal returns. Loughran and Ritter (1995) show that
returns following an initial public o¤ering or a seasoned equity o¤ering are low. On
the other hand, Ikenberry, Lakonishok, Vermaelen (1995) show that returns following
open market share repurchase announcements are high. In addition, Loughran and
Vijh (1997) show that returns of acquirers that complete stock mergers are low but
acquirers that complete cash tender o¤ers are high. Taken together, these e¤ects
can be summarized as follows: low returns follow high stock issuance, high returns
follow negative stock issuance. This turns out to be a general result. Ponti¤ and
Woodgate (2008) show that directly measuring a comprehensive net issuance measure
has incremental predictive power on subsequent stock returns after excluding the
data used in the studies for seasoned equity o¤ering, repurchase announcements, and
stock mergers. Following Fama and French (2008), Chen, Novy-Marx, Zhang (2011)
and Stambaugh, Yu, Yuan (2012), I measure net issuance as the annual change in
4This is a more direct way of measuring increase in capital investments relative to Titman, Wei,
Xie (2004)
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the natural log of the split-adjusted share outstanding. The split adjusted share
outstanding is share outstanding (item CSHO) times the adjustment factor (item
ADJEX_C)5. In the decile portfolio sorts, all stocks with negative net issues are
grouped into the lowest decile and all stocks with zero net issues are grouped into
decile 2. The remaining stocks are sorted into the remaining eight deciles. Similarly,
in the quintile portfolio sorts, all stocks with negative or zero net issues are grouped
into the lowest quintile. The remaining stocks are sorted into the remaining four
deciles.
Daniel and Titman (2006) expands on this literature by studying composite is-
suance, which measures the part of a rms growth in market value that is not at-
tributable to stock returns. Twelve months composite issuance can be measured as:




Only CRSP data is required for constructing this measure. In contrast to net
issuance, it is a comprehensive measure of the actions the rm takes to trade equity
ownership for cash or services (e.g. equity issues, employee stock option plans), or
pay cash or services for equity ownership (e.g. share repurchase, cash dividends). One
important component that is present in composite issuance but not in net issuance
is the payment in cash dividends. In this light, it incorporates an older literature
(e.g. Charest (1978), Miller and Scholes (1978, 1982), Litzenberger and Ramaswany
(1979,1980,1982), Keim (1985)) which documents that dividends are associated with
abnormal returns before SEC rule 10b-18 in 19826. After 1982, the percentage of
corporate payout in the form of repurchase programs grew substantially. Boudoukh,
Michaely, Richardson, Roberts (2008) document the structural break in predictive
5Ponti¤ and Woodgate (2008) use a similarly dened measure based on CRSP data.
6Rule 10b-18 made it easier for companies to buy back their shares on the open market without
fear of stock-manipulation charges.
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power of cash dividend after the rule was enacted and argue for viewing cash dividends
and share repurchases together as a payout yield.
Anomaly 7 and Anomaly 8: Return-on-Assets and Gross Protability
Haugen and Baker (1996), Fama and French (2006) show that high protability,
as measured by return on book equity, predicts high abnormal returns. However,
Fama and French (2008) show that this e¤ect is not very robust. More recently,
Chen, Novy-Marx, Zhang (2010) shows that the related protability measure- return
on asset, income before extraordinary item (item IBQ) divided by total assets last
scal quarter (item ATQ), produce more robust results using quarterly data instead
of annual data. Separately, Novy-Marx (2012) shows that high gross protability,
measured by dividing gross prot (item GP) by total assets (item AT), predicts high
abnormal return more robustly than return on book equity. He conjectures this is
because gross prot is a cleaner measure of true economic protability.
Anomaly 9 and Anomaly 10: Financial Distress: O-Score and Failure Probability
Dichev (1998) is the rst paper which analyzes the role of bankruptcy risk, as
measured by Ohlson (1980) O-Score and Altman (1968) Z-Score, in cross-sectional
returns. Surprisingly, he nds that higher bankruptcy risk is associated with low
subsequent average returns, contrary to the notion that investors should be compen-
sated for bearing higher distress risk. Campbell, Hilscher, Szilagyi (2008) constructs
a dynamic logit model to predict failure probability in the vein of works by Shumway
(2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2004). They also analyze distress risk in the context of
cross sectional returns, and nd that high distress stocks earn low average returns. I
measure distress using both Ohlson (1980) O-Score and Campbell, Hilscher, Szilagyi
(2008) 12 month ahead failure probability. The details of constructing each variable
are included in the appendix of this paper.
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Anomaly 11: Price Momentum (11/1/3)
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show that high prior returns predict high subsequent
abnormal returns. I measure price momentum by ranking stocks according to their
prior 12 months of return, skipping the most recent month7. I then hold portfolios for
3 months. Hence, the monthly return is based on an equal-weighted average of the of
portfolio returns from this months strategy, last months strategy, and the strategy
from two months ago.
4 Data Construction
For many of the anomalies, accounting data from Compustat is necessary for con-
structing the variables. I use the CRSP/Compustat Merged Database (CCM) Linking
Tables to link CRSP monthly data to Compustat annual data and quarterly data. I
ensure that the linkage is one-to-one for all months in my sample8. For stocks which
delist in a particular month9, the linking table often species the exact delist date as
the nal date in which the link is valid. As delistings often do not fall exactly at the
end of a month, a naïve use of the CCM Linking Tables would result in excluding the
returns for the delisting month10. I correct for this problem by separately identifying
the Compustat gvkey, if available, of stocks which delist in a particular month. Ac-
counting variables in Compustat annual les are used in portfolio sorts four months
after the end of the scal year, while accounting variables in Compustat quarterly
les are used in portfolio sorts in the month immediately after the most recent public
7In the original paper, they skip only one week. The practice of skipping one month has been
used by Fama and French (2008), Hou, Peng, Xiong (2009), Chen, Novy-Marx, Zhang (2010) and
others.
8I delete entries where LINKTYPE=LXor LDor LINKPRIM=Nor J
9Stocks with delisting code DLSTCD>=200
10This may complicate the well-known CRSP delisting bias. Even when CRSP delisting bias
is corrected, the delisting returns are excluded when using CCM Linking Tables to merge with
Compustat data.
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earnings announcement month (Compustat quarterly item RDQ). If RDQ is missing,
information is assumed to be publicly available three months after the end of the
quarter end. I include only common stocks (shrcd=10 or 11) in my analysis. For
results which use turnover as a measure of sentiment, I follow Lee and Swaminathan
(2000) and include only NYSE and AMEX stocks. This is because turnover for Nas-
daq stocks is inated relative to NYSE and AMEX stock due to double counting of
dealer trades. I include NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq stocks when FL ow is used as a
measure of sentiment. I correct for CRSP delisting bias by following a methodology
similar to Sumway (1997) and Shumway and Warther (1999). The exact details of
the procedure I use is documented in the Appendix.
5 Anomalies, Individual Stock Sentiment, and Stock
Returns
5.1 Long-short Strategies
Table 0A reports the Fama and French (1993) three factor alphas of the long leg and
short leg of each strategy as well as the zero-cost portfolio which is the combination
of these two legs. I verify that the zero-cost long-short portfolio based on all eleven
strategies produce positive and statistically signicant alpha when extreme decile
portfolios are considered. When extreme quintile portfolios are used instead, the
two growth based strategies, asset growth and investment-to-asset growth, lose their
statistical signicance. The magnitude of the spread is also signicantly reduced. The
two sentiment measures I consider, 12 month average turnover and 3 Year FL Flow,
also produce positive and statistically signicant alphas. This is consistent with the
notion that a high measure of sentiment should predict low subsequent risk adjusted
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Anomaly Start Date Long Leg Short Leg L/S (1) Start Date Long Leg Short Leg L/S (2)
Panel A: Financial Market Anomalies
Accrual May-51 0.205 -0.406 0.612 Feb-51 0.132 -0.306 0.438
[2.29] [-4.30] [4.47] [2.30] [-4.30] [4.15]
Asset Growth May-52 0.039 -0.305 0.344 Feb-52 0.055 -0.096 0.151
[0.41] [-3.34] [2.49] [0.85] [-1.58] [1.58]
Composite Equity Issues May-27 0.17 -0.451 0.621 May-27 0.147 -0.312 0.459
[2.65] [-6.63] [6.39] [2.88] [-5.41] [5.30]
Failure Probability Oct-71 0.289 -1.162 1.451 Oct-71 0.264 -1.195 1.459
[3.21] [-4.51] [4.77] [4.09] [-6.09] [6.21]
Gross Profitability May-51 0.437 -0.446 0.883 Mar-51 0.373 -0.408 0.781
[5.50] [-4.00] [6.26] [6.02] [-4.36] [7.01]
Investment To Assets Growth May-51 0.267 -0.294 0.561 Feb-51 -0.009 -0.127 0.118
[3.59] [-3.60] [4.89] [-0.14] [-2.30] [1.29]
Momentum (12/1/3) Mar-27 0.535 -1.3 1.835 Mar-27 0.42 -0.907 1.327
[5.09] [-8.58] [8.33] [5.62] [-7.55] [7.43]
Net Equity Issues May-62 0.177 -0.465 0.642 May-62 0.135 -0.446 0.581
[3.72] [-5.43] [6.41] [3.11] [-6.39] [6.28]
Net Operating Assets Dec-62 0.217 -0.466 0.683 Nov-62 0.119 -0.294 0.413
[2.00] [-5.62] [4.86] [1.59] [-5.12] [4.12]
Ohlson's O-Score Oct-71 0.245 -0.384 0.629 Oct-71 0.159 -0.217 0.376
[3.56] [-1.97] [2.87] [3.15] [-1.62] [2.52]
Return On Assets Apr-71 0.418 -1.065 1.483 Apr-71 0.295 -0.645 0.94
[5.10] [-5.30] [6.60] [5.08] [-3.83] [4.84]
Combination Of Anomalies Oct-71 0.26 -0.679 0.938 Oct-71 0.191 -0.483 0.674
[6.43] [-8.26] [9.54] [6.73] [-7.66] [8.67]
Panel B: Individual Stock Investor Sentiment
12 Month Average Turnover Jan-27 0.237 -0.291 0.528 Jan-27 0.148 -0.262 0.41
[3.12] [-3.02] [3.94] [2.55] [-3.47] [3.88]
3 Year FL Flow Apr-83 0.135 -0.322 0.456 Apr-83 0.147 -0.318 0.465
[1.04] [-2.19] [1.98] [1.36] [-2.86] [2.40]
Decile Portfolios Quintile Portfolios
Table 0A: Summary Statistics
This table reports calendar time portfolio Fama and French (1993) three factor alphas. At the beginning of each calendar month, stocks are 
ranked and assigned to one of ten decile portfolios or one of five quintile portfolios in a manner determined by previous studies and described in 
Section 2 and Section 3 of the main text. The combination of anomalies portfolio is constructed by equally weighing over the eleven anomalies. 
All stocks are value weighted within a given portfolio, and the portfolios are rebalanced every calendar month to maintain value weights. This 
table includes all NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq stocks with non-missing sentiment or anomaly variable information at portfolio formation. Nasdaq 
stocks are excluded in the calculation of the 12 month average turnover sentiment variable. Alpha is the intercept on a regression of monthly 
excess return from the rolling strategy. The explanatory variables are the monthly returns from Fama and French (1993) mimicking portfolios. 
L/S is the alpha of a zero-cost portfolio that longs the long leg and shorts the short leg of each strategy. Start date of each strategy is reported 
while end date is December 2011 for all strategies except for 3 year FL Flow, which ends in September 2010. Alphas are in monthly percent, t-
statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates and are based on the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of White (1980). 5% 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































average returns. Table 0B reports the Pearsons correlation coe¢ cient of the eleven
nancial market anomalies and the two individual stock investor sentiment measures
when using extreme quintile portfolios to form the long-short strategies. Overall,
the strategies are not highly correlated with each other. Of the eleven nancial
market anomalies, the highest correlation is between composite issuance and net
equity issues. They have a correlation of 0.77. The nancial market anomalies are
positively correlated with the individual stock investor sentiment strategies, except
between 3 year FL Flow and Accrual. When 12 month Average Turnover is used
as a measure of sentiment, the correlation ranges from 0.04 with Gross Protability
to 0.54 with Net Operating Assets. When 3 year FL Flow is used as a measure of
sentiment, the correlation ranges from -0.22 with Accrual to 0.54 with Composite
Issuance.
5.2 Relationship between anomalies and individual stock in-
vestor sentiment
In Table 1, I take a closer look at the relation between the nancial market anomalies
and the individual stock investor sentiment measures. At the beginning of calendar
month t, for each of the 11 anomalies, I independently sort stocks based on the value
of the anomaly variable at the end of calendar month t-1 and assign them into 5
quintiles (A1 to A5). A1 represents the long leg portfolio while A5 represents the
short leg portfolio as determined by previous studies. I also independently sort these
same rms with non-missing anomaly information using each of the two sentiment
measures (turnover, ow) in ascending order, and divide them into ve sentiment
quintiles (S1 to S5). The stocks are then assigned to 25 portfolios whose composition
is jointly determined by their membership in the 5 anomaly and 5 sentiment quintiles.
The 25 portfolios are rebalanced every calendar month to maintain value weights. The
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Panel A: Combination of Anomalies vs 12 month Average Turnover
Long Leg
12 month Average Turnover Long Leg Short Leg minus Short Leg
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 L/S
S1 0.246 0.182 0.128 0.027 -0.105 0.352
[2.81] [2.06] [1.52] [0.31] [-1.05] [3.67]
S2 0.186 0.197 0.146 0.106 -0.101 0.287
[2.26] [2.39] [2.08] [1.44] [-1.07] [2.91]
S3 0.178 0.141 0.115 0.025 -0.215 0.392
[2.61] [2.07] [1.93] [0.40] [-2.43] [4.26]
S4 0.077 0.031 -0.042 -0.198 -0.394 0.47
[1.20] [0.48] [-0.61] [-3.02] [-4.92] [5.69]
S5 0.032 -0.114 -0.183 -0.316 -0.714 0.746
[0.32] [-1.20] [-1.88] [-3.19] [-6.24] [7.49]
Low Turnover minus High Turnover 0.214 0.295 0.311 0.343 0.608 -0.395
[1.51] [2.11] [2.31] [2.53] [4.25] [-3.16]
Panel B: Combination of Anomalies vs 3 year FL Flow Long Leg
3 year FL Flow Long Leg Short Leg minus Short Leg
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 L/S
S1 0.324 0.191 0.088 0.018 -0.216 0.54
[2.93] [1.79] [0.88] [0.18] [-1.80] [4.70]
S2 0.323 0.176 0.107 0.019 -0.265 0.588
[3.77] [2.43] [1.47] [0.25] [-2.66] [5.25]
S3 0.231 0.093 0.131 -0.066 -0.36 0.591
[2.87] [1.14] [1.75] [-0.81] [-2.80] [4.07]
S4 0.097 -0.048 -0.055 -0.095 -0.529 0.626
[1.15] [-0.61] [-0.77] [-1.02] [-4.33] [5.10]
S5 -0.034 -0.182 -0.23 -0.367 -0.794 0.76
[-0.38] [-1.94] [-2.24] [-2.92] [-5.38] [6.44]
Low Flow minus High Flow 0.358 0.373 0.318 0.385 0.578 -0.22
[2.21] [2.26] [1.85] [2.01] [3.05] [-2.05]
Combination of Anomalies
Table 1: Combination of Anomalies vs Individual Stock Investor Sentiment
This table reports calendar time portfolio abnormal returns. At the beginning of each calendar month, stocks are double sorted on 
the basis of each of the eleven anomaly measure and each of my two individual stock investor sentiment measure: 12 month 
average turnover and 3 year FL Flow into 5x5 value weighted portfolios. For each strategy, stocks are ranked in an order such 
that a smaller (higher) number in the ranking variable corresponds to higher (lower) returns as documented in previous studies.  
All stocks are value weighted within a given portfolio, and the portfolios are rebalanced every calendar month to maintain value 
weights. The combination of anomalies portfolio is constructed by equally weighing over the eleven anomalies for each of the 25 
value weighted portfolios. This table includes all NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq stocks with non-missing sentiment or anomaly variable 
information at portfolio formation. Nasdaq stocks are excluded when 12 month average turnover is used as a sentiment variable. 
Alpha is the intercept on a regression of monthly excess return from the rolling strategy. The explanatory variables are the 
monthly returns from Fama and French (1993) mimicking portfolios. L/S is the alpha of a zero-cost portfolio that longs the 
bottom 20% of stock and shorts the top 20% of stock as determined by the ranking variables. When 12 month average turnover is 
used as a measure of sentiment, start date is February 1975 and end date is December 2011. When 3 year FL Flow is used as a 
measure of sentiment, start date is July 1983 and end date is September 2010. Returns and alphas are in monthly percent, t-
statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates and are based on the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of White 
(1980). 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.
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combination-of-anomalies portfolio is constructed by equal-weighting over the eleven
anomalies for each of the 25 value weighted portfolios. I require all 25 portfolios to
continuously have at least 8 stocks in each month for su¢ cient diversication. As
the completeness of the information required for each anomaly varies, the start date
varies from 12:1947 for composite issuance to 2:1975 for the distress and O-Score
anomaly. The complete list of start dates is included in Table 2.
I focus my analysis on the combination of anomalies portfolio, which can be in-
terpreted as an average anomalies e¤ect which has diversied away some of the
idiosyncratic components of each of the anomaly. Panel A of Table 1 reports Fama
French 3-factor alphas when 12 month Average Turnover is used as a measure of
individual stock investor sentiment. The right-most column shows whether there is
an average anomalies e¤ect within each turnover quintile. If the average anomalies
e¤ect dominates the turnover e¤ect, then this column should be equal to zero. The
data strongly rejects this hypothesis. Across all ve turnover quintiles, the anomalies
e¤ect remains statistically signicant with an economically signicant magnitude of
28.7 to 74.6 basis points per month.
The bottom row shows whether there is a turnover e¤ect within each anomalies
quintile. If the turnover e¤ect dominates the average anomalies e¤ect, then this row
should be equal to zero. The data strongly rejects this. Across all ve anomalies
quintiles, the turnover e¤ect remains statistically signicant with an economically
signicant magnitude of 21.4 to 60.8 basis points per month.
Panel B reports Fama French 3-factor alphas when 3 year FL Flow is used as
a measure of individual stock investor sentiment. The results are very similar to
the case when 12 month Average Turnover is used as a measure of individual stock
investor sentiment. One salient feature of the results in Panel A and Panel B is
that the average anomalies e¤ect is substantially larger within the largest sentiment
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quintile. On the other hand, the sentiment e¤ect is also substantially larger within
the largest average anomalies quintile. This suggests that there is an interaction e¤ect
between individual stock investor sentiment and the average anomalies e¤ect. A closer
examination reveals that this interaction e¤ect is primarily driven by the very low
return of the high sentiment short leg of the average anomaly (the A5S5 portfolio).11
We will explore this phenomenon in greater depth in the next few sections.
6 Individual Stock Sentiment Hypothesis
In this section I describe the rst hypothesis and describe a few approaches to test the
hypothesis. I conjecture that the anomaly return is partially driven by cross-sectional
variation in individual stock investor sentiment.
HYPOTHESIS 1 (INDIVIDUAL STOCK SENTIMENT HYPOTHESIS):
A zero-cost long-short portfolio based on each of the 11 nancial market anomalies
we consider earn positive 3-factor alpha. If this is primarily driven by sentiment
shocks pushing stock prices away from fundamental value, then the positive abnormal
return of the long leg of each anomaly is concentrated in low sentiment stocks.
Similarly, the negative abnormal return of the short leg of each anomaly is
concentrated in high sentiment stocks.
Furthermore, the relative di¢ culty of short selling versus buying may limit the
ability of rational traders to correct overpricing more so than underpricing. If this is
the case, the e¤ect that high sentiment has on the short leg of each anomaly is much
greater than the e¤ect that low sentiment has on the long leg of each anomaly.
11This interaction e¤ect does not appear by just choosing any two anomaly and forming extreme
quitile portfolios by double sorting them. For example, in Appendix Table 2, I report CAPM alphas
when double sorting on value and size. It is notable that the large capitalization growth portfolio
has negative alpha that is not statistically signicant.
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6.1 Fama-MacBeth regressions
There are three main implications of Hypothesis 1. Firstly, Hypothesis 1 implies that
there is an interaction e¤ect between low sentiment and the long leg of each anomaly.
Secondly, it implies that there is an interaction e¤ect between high sentiment and
the short leg of each anomaly. Thirdly, it says that the e¤ect high sentiment has
on the short leg of each anomaly is much larger than the e¤ect that low sentiment
has on the long leg of each anomaly. The idea that short sale constraints may cause
some securities to be overpriced traces back to at least Miller (1977) and was recently
applied in Stambaugh, Yu, Yuan (2012). To test for these interaction e¤ects, I use
a Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross sectional regression approach separately for each
nancial market anomalies and for each individual stock investor sentiment variable.
The dependent variable is excess return in month t. The independent variables of
interest are two dummy variables constructed using the 25 portfolios constructed by
independently sorting all stocks into ve anomaly categories and ve stock sentiment
categories.12 The rst dummy variable returns a value of 1 if the stock is in the low
sentiment long leg of a particular anomaly (A1S1) at the end of month t-1. The
second dummy variable returns a value of 1 if the stock is in the high sentiment short
leg of a particular anomaly (A5S5) at the end of month t-1. Hypothesis 1 implies
that the estimated coe¢ cient of dummy(A1S1) is positive and the estimated coe¢ -
cient of dummy(A5S5) is negative. Furthermore, the absolute value of the estimated
coe¢ cient of dummy(A5S5) should be larger than the absolute value of the estimated
coe¢ cient of dummy(A1S1).
12Recall from Section 5.2 that at the beginning of calendar month t, for each of the 11 anomalies,
I independently sort stocks based on the anomaly variable known at the end of calendar month t-1
and assign them into 5 quintile portfolios (A1 to A5). A1 represents the long leg portfolio while
A5 represents the short leg portfolio as determined by previous studies. I then independently sort
these same rms with non-missing anomaly information based on each of the two sentiment measure
(turnover, ow) in ascending order, and divide them into ve sentiment portfolios (S1 to S5).
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I include as controls the logarithm of size and logarithm of book-to-market.13
This controls for well-known cross sectional determinants of return related to size
and book-to-market. In addition, I include the anomaly variable and the individual
stock investor sentiment variable to pinpoint the incremental e¤ects of being in the
A1S1 or A5S5 portfolio.
Table 2 shows that the result is broadly consistent with my rst hypothesis. When
I use 12 month Average Turnover as a measure of stock sentiment, the estimated co-
e¢ cient for dummy(A5S5) is negative across all eleven anomalies and statistically
signicant for ten of the eleven anomalies. It is only statistically insignicant for
the Investment to Asset Growth anomaly. This means that after controlling for size,
book-to-market, 12 month Average Turnover (the sentiment variable), and the anom-
aly variable itself, there is still an incremental e¤ect of being in the high sentiment
short leg portfolios. On the other hand, there does not appear to be evidence of an
interaction e¤ect between low turnover and the long leg of anomalies.
When I use 3 year FL Flow, the results are similar. The estimated coe¢ cient for
dummy(A5S5) is negative across all eleven anomalies and statistically signicant for
nine of the eleven anomalies. It is only insignicant for the momentum anomaly and
the Ohlsons O-Score anomaly. On the other hand, the interaction e¤ect between low
sentiment and the long leg of anomalies appears stronger than when turnover is used
as a measure of sentiment. The estimated coe¢ cient for dummy(A1S1) is positive
across all 11 anomalies and statistically signicant for 5 of the 11 anomalies.
One interesting result here which holds for both measures of sentiment is that
once the dummy variables are included in the Fama-MacBeth regressions, the senti-
ment measure itself loses its statistical signicance for most of the anomalies. This
means that both of our sentiment measures have strong predictive powers only in the
13I report results which include two liquidity related controls- Dollar Volume and the Amihud


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































intersection of the extreme deciles in sentiment and the nancial market anomalies
considered. These results in Table 2 are broadly supportive of hypothesis 1.
6.2 Calendar time portfolio approach
I also test hypothesis 1 using a calendar time portfolio approach. Table 3A and Table
3B report the portfolio abnormal returns of the long leg, short leg, and long minus
short zero-cost portfolio for each of the 11 anomalies separately for low sentiment and
high sentiment.
Table 3A reports Fama and French 3-factor alphas when using 12 month Average
Turnover14 as a measure of individual stock investor sentiment while Table 3B reports
Fama and French 3-factor alphas when using 3 year FL Flow as a measure of individual
stock investor sentiment. I rst consider the equal weighted average of the anomalies
using 12 month Average Turnover (3 year FL Flow) as a measure of sentiment. For
the long leg, the low sentiment portfolio outperforms the high sentiment portfolio by
0.214% (0.358%) per month [t-statistics: 1.51 (2.21) ]. For the short leg, the high
sentiment portfolio underperforms the low sentiment portfolio by 0.608% (0.578%)
per month [t-statistics: 4.25 (3.05)]. As consistent with the results from the Fama
MacBeth regressions, sentiment has a larger e¤ect on the short leg than it does on
the long leg of anomalies. This di¤erence is statistically signicant [t-statistics: 3.18
(2.05)]. This asymmetry seems to be a unique feature that sentiment has on nancial
market anomalies and is absent when other measures are used. In Appendix Table 4,
I report results when liquidity related measures are used in lieu of sentiment related
measures. The main result there is that the assymetry dissappears.
Now I turn to looking into the set of 11 anomalies on an individual basis, which
14I also report results using di¤erent specication of Average Turnover in Appendix Table 4. In
particular, I report results using 1,3,6,12 (base case), 24, 36, 60 months Average Turnover as my
rst measure of individual stock sentiment. The results are similar.
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Accrual 0.128 0.053 0.075 -0.115 -0.645 0.53 0.243 0.698 -0.455
[0.88] [0.36] [0.37] [-0.87] [-4.62] [2.93] [1.24] [4.07] [-1.92]
Asset Growth -0.066 -0.14 0.074 0.152 -0.412 0.564 -0.218 0.272 -0.49
[-0.46] [-0.98] [0.35] [0.99] [-2.92] [2.95] [-1.06] [1.71] [-2.06]
Composite Equity Issues 0.095 -0.051 0.147 0.071 -0.571 0.641 0.025 0.519 -0.495
[1.00] [-0.44] [0.99] [0.61] [-5.20] [4.08] [0.17] [3.92] [-2.62]
Failure Probability 0.438 0.153 0.284 -0.191 -1.255 1.064 0.629 1.409 -0.78
[3.36] [1.02] [1.37] [-0.96] [-5.12] [3.64] [2.63] [4.51] [-2.20]
Gross Profitability 0.341 0.029 0.312 -0.077 -0.462 0.385 0.418 0.491 -0.073
[2.80] [0.19] [1.58] [-0.66] [-2.90] [1.94] [2.72] [2.59] [-0.31]
Investment To Assets Growth 0.186 -0.102 0.288 0.109 -0.311 0.42 0.077 0.209 -0.131
[1.52] [-0.76] [1.51] [0.67] [-2.10] [2.01] [0.39] [1.22] [-0.54]
Momentum (12/1/3) 0.263 0.083 0.18 -0.523 -1.223 0.699 0.786 1.306 -0.519
[1.72] [0.55] [0.94] [-2.61] [-6.32] [3.40] [2.76] [5.01] [-1.84]
Net Equity Issues 0.166 0.141 0.026 -0.197 -0.701 0.505 0.363 0.842 -0.479
[1.59] [1.08] [0.15] [-1.47] [-5.01] [2.64] [2.23] [5.67] [-2.22]
Net Operating Assets 0.15 -0.083 0.233 0.003 -0.667 0.67 0.147 0.584 -0.437
[1.39] [-0.55] [1.29] [0.02] [-4.46] [3.44] [0.85] [3.46] [-1.91]
Ohlson's O-Score 0.224 -0.067 0.291 0.005 -0.831 0.836 0.219 0.765 -0.545
[1.40] [-0.49] [1.34] [0.03] [-3.33] [2.82] [0.90] [2.62] [-1.43]
Return On Assets 0.536 0.038 0.498 -0.693 -0.982 0.289 1.229 1.02 0.21
[3.44] [0.24] [2.16] [-4.08] [-5.50] [1.18] [5.37] [4.53] [0.66]
Combination Of Anomalies 0.246 0.032 0.214 -0.105 -0.714 0.608 0.352 0.746 -0.395
[2.81] [0.32] [1.51] [-1.05] [-6.24] [4.25] [3.67] [7.49] [-3.16]
Table 3A: Anomalies return conditioned on low stock sentiment and high stock sentiment
This table reports calendar time portfolio abnormal returns. At the beginning of each calendar month, stocks are independently double sorted on the basis of 
each of the eleven anomaly measure and my first sentiment measure: 12 month average turnover into 5x5 value weighted portfolios. All stocks are value 
weighted within a given portfolio, and the portfolios are rebalanced every calendar month to maintain value weights. This table includes all NYSE/AMEX 
stocks with non-missing sentiment and anomaly variable information at portfolio formation. Alpha is the intercept on a regression of monthly excess return 
from the rolling strategy. The explanatory variables are the monthly returns from Fama and French (1993) mimicking portfolios. The long leg and short leg 
portfolios are as determined by previous studies, and represent the extreme quintile portfolios of different anomaly variables. Low turnover represent the 
lowest 20% quintile in 12 month average turnover. High turnover represent the highest 20% quintile in 12 month average turnover. Long-Short is the alpha 
of a zero-cost portfolio that longs the long leg and shorts the short leg of each strategy, with low turnover and high turnover separately reported. Start date 
of each strategy is as reported in table 4A while end date is December 2011. Returns and alphas are in monthly percent, t-statistics are shown below the 
coefficient estimates and are based on the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of White (1980). 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.
Long Leg Short Leg Long - Short
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Sentiment Measure: Three Year FL Flow
Anomaly Low Flow Flow - High Low Flow Flow - High Low Flow Flow - High
Fama-Frech 3-factor alpha
Accrual 0.208 -0.063 0.271 -0.154 -0.632 0.479 0.362 0.57 -0.208
[1.31] [-0.39] [1.13] [-0.73] [-3.52] [1.64] [1.48] [2.87] [-0.72]
Asset Growth 0.218 0.039 0.179 -0.038 -0.65 0.612 0.256 0.689 -0.433
[1.42] [0.25] [0.85] [-0.22] [-3.75] [2.51] [1.21] [3.09] [-1.61]
Composite Equity Issues 0.162 -0.102 0.263 0.098 -0.622 0.72 0.063 0.52 -0.457
[1.31] [-0.86] [1.52] [0.59] [-3.75] [2.94] [0.35] [2.90] [-1.97]
Failure Probability 0.378 0.035 0.342 -1.283 -1.449 0.167 1.66 1.485 0.176
[2.56] [0.25] [1.88] [-3.64] [-4.97] [0.46] [4.02] [4.25] [0.46]
Gross Profitability 0.328 0.175 0.153 0.003 -0.596 0.598 0.325 0.771 -0.446
[2.10] [1.14] [0.70] [0.01] [-2.95] [2.01] [1.31] [2.93] [-1.54]
Investment To Assets Growth 0.031 -0.327 0.358 0 -0.61 0.61 0.03 0.283 -0.252
[0.21] [-2.23] [1.61] [0.00] [-3.57] [2.59] [0.16] [1.45] [-0.99]
Momentum (12/1/3) 0.491 0.173 0.318 -0.56 -1.267 0.708 1.05 1.44 -0.39
[2.62] [1.14] [1.56] [-2.04] [-4.06] [2.75] [2.65] [3.81] [-1.36]
Net Equity Issues 0.257 -0.125 0.382 -0.229 -0.553 0.324 0.487 0.429 0.058
[2.02] [-1.02] [2.06] [-1.37] [-3.26] [1.26] [2.79] [2.38] [0.26]
Net Operating Assets 0.385 0.021 0.364 -0.233 -0.679 0.446 0.618 0.7 -0.082
[2.22] [0.12] [1.47] [-1.54] [-3.92] [1.84] [3.36] [3.14] [-0.35]
Ohlson's O-Score 0.42 -0.205 0.625 0.104 -0.569 0.673 0.316 0.364 -0.049
[2.81] [-1.33] [2.60] [0.47] [-2.53] [2.56] [1.13] [1.47] [-0.15]
Return On Assets 0.569 0.11 0.458 -0.214 -0.944 0.73 0.782 1.054 -0.272
[3.79] [0.74] [2.02] [-0.84] [-3.76] [2.39] [2.72] [3.53] [-0.87]
Combination Of Anomalies 0.324 -0.034 0.358 -0.216 -0.794 0.578 0.54 0.76 -0.22
[2.93] [-0.38] [2.21] [-1.80] [-5.38] [3.05] [4.70] [6.44] [-2.05]
Table 3B: Anomalies return conditioned on low stock sentiment and high stock sentiment
This table reports calendar time portfolio abnormal returns. At the beginning of each calendar month, stocks are independently double sorted on the basis of 
each of the eleven anomaly measure and my second sentiment measure: 3 year FL Flow into 5x5 value weighted portfolios. All stocks are value weighted 
within a given portfolio, and the portfolios are rebalanced every calendar month to maintain value weights. This table includes all NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq 
stocks with non-missing sentiment and anomaly variable information at portfolio formation. Alpha is the intercept on a regression of monthly excess return 
from the rolling strategy. The explanatory variables are the monthly returns from Fama and French (1993) mimicking portfolios. The long leg and short leg 
portfolios are as determined by previous studies, and represent the extreme quintile portfolios of different anomaly variables. Low turnover represent the 
lowest 20% quintile in 12 month average turnover. High turnover represent the highest 20% quintile in 12 month average turnover. Long-Short is the alpha 
of a zero-cost portfolio that longs the long leg and shorts the short leg of each strategy, with low turnover and high turnover separately reported. All 
strategies start in April 1983 except price momentum, which starts in July 1983. All strategies end in September 2010. Returns and alphas are in monthly 
percent, t-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates and are based on the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of White (1980). 5% 
statistical significance is indicated in bold.
Long Leg Short Leg Long - Short
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paints a similar picture to the results obtained when looking at the equal weighted
average of the anomalies. Using 12 month Average Turnover (3 year FL Flow) as
a measure of sentiment, all 11 (11) anomalies produce higher returns following low
sentiment rather than high sentiment for the long leg. However, this is only statisti-
cally signicant at the 5% level for one (three) of the eleven anomalies. For the short
leg, all 11 (11) anomalies produce lower return following high sentiment rather than
low sentiment. This is statistically signicant at the 5% level for 9 (7) of the eleven
anomalies. Taken together, the long-short portfolio is higher following high sentiment
for 10 (9) of the eleven anomalies.
Similar to the time series result of Stambaugh, Yu, Yuan (2012), I nd that the
e¤ect of individual stock investor sentiment on the 11 anomalies that survive risk
adjustment by the Fama and French 3-factor model is more pronounced in the short
leg. This result is slightly stronger when 12 month average turnover is used as a
measure of sentiment instead of 3 year FL Flow. This is consistent with the notion
that it is relatively more di¢ cult for arbitrageurs to correct for overpricing by shorting
stocks.
A related study by Gervais, Kaniel, Mingelgrin (2001) nd that stocks experienc-
ing unusually high (low) trading volume15 over a day or a week tend to appreciate
(depreciate) over the course of the following month. At rst blush, this may be con-
tradictory with what we nd. In our study, high turnover-conditioned short legs of
anomalies earn much lower returns than low turnover-conditioned short legs. I ex-
amine this potential contradiction by analyzing my results using 12 month Average
Turnover that skips the turnover of the most recent month. The results are shown
in Appendix Table 5. Surprisingly, the high turnover-conditioned short legs does not
have more negative returns without conditioning on the most recent month turnover,
15A stock whose trading volume that day is among its top (bottom) ve daily trading volumes
over the last 50 trading days is categorized as a "high-volume" ("low-volume") stock.
31
as might be expected given the results of Gervais, Kaniel, Mingelgrin. This result
suggests that persistently high turnover is capturing a subset of stocks which is very
di¤erent from those which experience a sudden and unusual spike in volume.
6.3 Sentiment-conditioned Strategies
Hypothesis 1 and the previous results imply that a sentiment-based anomaly long-
short strategy, in which I restrict the long leg of each anomaly to low sentiment stock
and the short leg of each anomaly to high sentiment stock, should yield signicantly
higher returns than a simple anomaly long-short strategy. I refer to this sentiment-
based anomaly long-short strategy as the sentiment-enhanced anomaly strategy. In
contrast, Hypothesis 1 also implies that a sentiment-based anomaly long-short strat-
egy, in which I restrict the long leg of each anomaly to high sentiment stock and
the short leg of each anomaly to low sentiment stock, should yield signicantly lower
returns than a simple anomaly long-short strategy. I refer to this sentiment-based
anomaly long-short strategy as the sentiment-impaired anomaly strategy. Recall that
Ive constructed 25 portfolios by independently sorting all stocks into ve anom-
aly categories and ve stock sentiment categories.16 Then the sentiment-enhanced
anomaly strategy is the portfolio A1S1-A5S5; while the sentiment-impaired anomaly
strategy is A1S5-A5S1.
To benchmark these sentiment conditioned strategies, I also construct a simple
anomaly strategy which is not conditional on any sentiment information (A1-A5). I
use only the sample of stocks contained in the 25 portfolios used to construct the sen-
16Recall from Section 5.2 that at the beginning of calendar month t, for each of the 11 anomalies,
I independently sort stocks based on the anomaly variable known at the end of calendar month t-1
and assign them into 5 quintile portfolios (A1 to A5). A1 represents the long leg portfolio while
A5 represents the short leg portfolio as determined by previous studies. I then independently sort
these same rms with non-missing anomaly information based on each of the two sentiment measure
(turnover, ow) in ascending order, and divide them into ve sentiment portfolios (S1 to S5).
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timent conditioned anomaly strategies. This provides an apples to apples comparison
to the sentiment conditioned anomaly strategies.
6.4 Results
Table 4A and Table 4B show the basic result. For each of the 11 anomalies, and
separately for each measure of sentiment, I report calendar time portfolio abnormal
returns associated with the sentiment-enhanced anomaly strategy, the sentiment-
impaired anomaly strategy, and the simple anomaly strategy. The rightmost three
columns report the di¤erence in abnormal returns between the sentiment-enhanced
anomaly strategy and the simple anomaly strategy, the sentiment-impaired anomaly
strategy and the simple anomaly strategy, and the two sentiment strategies. Table 4A
reports the results when using 12 month Average Turnover as a measure of sentiment.
Table 4B reports the results when using 3 Year FL Flow as a measure of sentiment.
I adjust portfolio returns using the Fama and French 3-factor model. I rst look
at the results which use 12 month Average Turnover as a measure of sentiment. As
implied by Hypothesis 1, the column (1)-(3), which reports the abnormal return of the
sentiment-enhanced strategy minus the simple anomaly strategy, should be positive.
As consistent with my hypothesis, the equal weighted average of the anomalies show a
positive di¤erence in abnormal returns between the sentiment-enhanced strategy and
the simple anomaly strategy. The di¤erence in return becomes statistically signicant
at the 5% level. The di¤erence in the magnitude of the abnormal returns is also
economically signicant. The simple anomaly strategy earns abnormal returns of
0.526% per month [t-statistic = 6.88]. In contrast, the sentiment-enhanced strategy
earns abnormal returns of 0.96% [t-statistic = 6.37], which is roughly 82% larger than
the simple anomaly strategy.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the equal weighted average of the anomalies, using the 3-factor model as a base
case, the sentiment-enhanced anomaly strategy earns abnormal returns of 1.118%
[t-statistics=4.91] per month. In comparison, the simple anomaly strategy earns ab-
normal returns of 0.542% [t-statistics=5.95] per month. The di¤erence of 0.474% per
month is statistically signicant at the 5% level [t-statistics=2.71]. The magnitude of
the di¤erence is economically nontrivial: it translates to roughly 5.83% in annualized
return.
Now I turn to looking into the set of 11 anomalies on an individual basis. For
both measures of sentiment, all 11 anomalies show a positive di¤erence in abnormal
returns.
Using 12 month Average Turnover as a measure of sentiment, 9 of these are
statistically signicant at the 5% level after adjusting the return using the Fama and
French 3-factor model. Using 3 year FL Flow as a measure of sentiment, 6 of these
are statistically signicant at the 5% level using the Fama French 3-factor model.
Next I turn to the second implication of hypothesis 1, which says that the abnormal
return of the simple anomaly strategy minus the sentiment-impaired anomaly strategy
should be negative. Using turnover as a measure of sentiment, the equal weighted
average of the anomalies show a negative di¤erence in abnormal returns. Similar to
the result reported for (1)-(3), the di¤erence in return become statistically signicant
at the 5% level when abnormal returns are adjusted using any of the three factor
models I consider. What is more surprising, however, is that the sentiment-impaired
strategy earns Fama and French (1993) abnormal returns of only 0.137% per month
and the strategy becomes statistically insignicant [t-statistics 0.94]. This means
that without properly conditioning for sentiment, anomaly strategies no longer deliver
abnormal returns that survive Fama and French (1993) adjustments.
Using 3 year FL Flow as a measure of sentiment again yields similar results. For
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the equal weighted average of the anomalies, using the 3-factor model to adjust for
risk, the sentiment-impaired anomaly strategy earns abnormal returns of only 0.182
% [t-statistics=1.13] per month. This is 0.462% [t-statistics=2.59] lower than the
result for the simple anomaly strategy.
Looking at the anomalies on an individual basis, all 11 anomalies show a negative
di¤erence in Fama French 3 factor alphas for both measures of sentiment. In addition,
5 of these are statistically signicant at the 5% level for both measures of sentiment.
Overall, the strength of the di¤erence in abnormal return between the simple anomaly
strategy and the sentiment-impaired strategy is slightly weaker than the di¤erence in
abnormal return between the sentiment-enhanced strategy and the simple anomaly
strategy.
Finally, I look at the abnormal return of the sentiment-enhanced anomaly strategy
minus the sentiment-impaired anomaly strategy. This strategy has the interesting
property that it is anomaly neutral. This is easy to see: the strategy is long the
low sentiment long leg of the anomaly and short the high sentiment long leg of the
anomaly. On the other hand, it is long the low sentiment short leg of the anomaly
and short the high sentiment short leg of the anomaly. If sentiment is not a driving
force in the abnormal returns of anomalies, we should expect the abnormal returns to
be 0. Naturally, this is strongly rejected in the data, as implied from our previous two
results. Using the baseline Fama French 3 factor model to calculate abnormal returns
and using turnover (ow) as a measure of sentiment, the equal weighted average of
the anomalies show a positive abnormal return of 0.822% (0.937%) per month [t-
statistics = 3.21 (2.79) ] for this anomaly neutral strategy. Looking at the individual
anomalies, this result is very robust: all 11 (11) anomalies show a positive sign with
9 (6) of these being statistical signicant at the 5% level.
Taken together, these results strongly support the hypothesis that sentiment
37
shocks are partially responsible for the previously documented abnormal returns of
anomaly strategies. They show that there is a lot of cross sectional variation in
returns within rms that have the same quintile of rm characteristics; and this
cross-sectional variation within characteristics can be sorted out using measures that
proxy for individual stock investor sentiment.
6.5 Robustness to size
In this section, I analyze the e¤ect of rm size on the results. As the analysis involves
double sorting stocks along each anomaly variable and each sentiment variable, further
partitioning this sample along the size dimension would lead to too many portfolios
with insu¢ cient stocks. Since the objective of this paper is to analyze the systematic
impact of sentiment shocks on anomalies as opposed to idiosyncratic e¤ects on a
particular anomaly, I focus my e¤orts in analyzing only the equal weighted average
of anomalies.
Recall that for each anomaly, stocks are assigned to one of 25 portfolios based
on anomaly ranking and sentiment ranking. It follows that for the equal weighted
average of the anomalies, the weights of a stock j in a particular anomaly-sentiment







Using NYSE/AMEX breakpoints, I further assign each stock that appears in any
of the combination of anomalies-sentiment portfolios into one of the 5 NYSE/AMEX
size quintiles. Notice that the combination weights depend on two factors: how large
the stock is relative to the other stocks in a particular anomaly-sentiment portfolio;
and the number of times the same stock appears in the same anomaly-sentiment port-
folio across the eleven anomalies. Hence, if I simply re-calculate the value weights of
each stock based on whether they appear in a particular anomaly-sentiment portfolio
or not, this will underweight stocks which appear in the same anomaly-sentiment
38
portfolio of many of the anomalies and overweight stocks that appear only in one
of the anomalies but is relatively large in size. To avoid this problem, I weigh each
stock using the combination weights combination weightsj and rescale it so that it





Table 5A reports the results when 12 month average turnover is used as a mea-
sure of sentiment. The sentiment-enhanced anomaly strategy has 3-factor alpha that
monotonously decreases as size increases from 2.412% per month for the smallest
quintile to 0.78% per month for the largest quintile. On the other hand, the sentiment-
impaired anomaly strategy has 3-factor alpha that shows less of a trend across size
quintiles. However, it also appears to be larger as size increases. For the smallest quin-
tile, 3-factor alpha is -1.807% per month while for the largest quintile, it is -0.096% per
month. Taken together, the spread between the sentiment-enhanced anomaly strategy
and the sentiment-impaired anomaly strategy is largest in the smallest decile with a
3-factor alpha of 4.219% per month [t-statistics = 5.02]. This translates to 64.19% an-
nualized alpha. This drops o¤signicantly to 1.851% per month [t-statistics=4.07] for
the second smallest quintile and 0.875% per month [t-statistics=2.28] for the largest
quintile. Nevertheless, the results are all statistically signicant and the economic
magnitudes are all nontrivial.
Table 5B reports the results where ow is used as a measure of sentiment. The
sentiment-enhanced anomaly strategy has 3 factor alpha that is relatively stable be-
tween 0.876% per month to 1.144% per month. The sentiment-impaired anomaly
strategy is less stable across quintiles. It is lowest in the extreme quintiles but higher
in the middle quintiles. The overall e¤ect is that the spread between the sentiment-
enhanced anomaly strategy and the sentiment-impaired anomaly strategy is only






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































tile using the 3-factor model. Nevertheless, the magnitudes are large: it is 0.847%
per month for the smallest quintile and 1.109% per month for the largest quintile.
The weaker statistical signicance relative to turnover as a sentiment measure may be
partially contributed by its relatively shorter time series. The somewhat surprising
result for ow where the e¤ect is strongest for the largest stocks is consistent with
the ndings of Frazinni and Lamont (2008), who nd that the long-short portfolio
constructed by ranking the 3 year FL Flow variable is stronger for large capitalization
stocks. Overall, the results in Table 4A and Table 4B are largely robust to size.
6.6 Other robustness checks
Table 6A and Table 6B show the abnormal returns to the sentiment-enhanced anom-
aly strategy, the sentiment-impaired strategy, and the simple anomaly strategy using
alternative models to adjust for excess returns. In particular, I use the CAPM, the
Cahart (1997) 4-factor model, a 4-factor model which augments the 3-factor model
with the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) traded liquidity factor, and a 5-factor model
which augments the 3-factor model with the Cahart (1997) momentum factor and the
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) traded liquidity factor to adjust for portfolio excess re-
turns. I focus my e¤orts in analyzing only the equal weighted average of anomalies.
This pattern of return appears to be robust to the di¤erent factor models employed.
The sentiment-enhanced anomaly strategy outperforms the simple anomaly strat-
egy, which in turn outperforms the sentiment-impaired anomaly strategy even when
the 5-factor model is used to correct for risks for both measures of sentiment. The
sentiment-impaired strategy no longer delivers any statistically signicant abnormal
returns di¤erent from 0 when using alternative factor models to correct for risks as
well. This is the same result to what we nd in previous sections of the paper.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































returns are used instead of value weighted returns. Overall, when equal weights are
used in forming the double sorted portfolios, the results become more dramatic when
12 month Average Turnover is used as a measure of sentiment. On the other hand, it
remains similar in magnitude when 3 year FL Flow is used as a measure of sentiment.
For example, using 12 month Average Turnover as a measure of individual stock
investor sentiment, the 3-factor alpha of the sentiment-enhanced anomaly strategy
increases from 0.96% per month to 1.541% per month. In addition, the sentiment-
impaired anomaly strategy decreases from 0.138% to -0.204% per month. On the
other hand, using 3 year FL Flow as a measure of individual stock investor sentiment,
the 3-factor alpha of the sentiment-enhanced anomaly strategy stays roughly the
same while the 3-factor alpha of the sentiment-impaired anomaly strategy actually
increases. Overall, the results in Table 4A and Table 4B are also robust to adjusting
risks using alternative factor models and using equal weights instead of value weights
in forming the 25 portfolios.
7 Relationship of sentiment, issuance, and anom-
aly returns
In this section I describe the second hypothesis which links issuance activities of
managers with individual stock investor sentiment and anomaly returns. There is a
long literature which shows that rms tend to issue equity when the cost of equity
is high, and repurchase equity when the cost of equity is low. I conjecture that the
rm, being rational and informed, will issue or repurchase shares to take advantage
of the abnormal returns of anomalies.
HYPOTHESIS 2 (FIRM AS ARBITRAGEUR HYPOTHESIS):
45
If the abnormal returns to the broad set of anomalies represent mispricings, a
natural candidate to take advantage of these mispricings is the rm. If a rm is in
the short leg of an anomaly, then the rm should respond by engaging in activities
which trade equity ownership for cash or services (e.g. issuance of shares, stock
acquisitions). This opportunistically takes advantage of the low cost of equity
a¤orded by sentiment-induced demand. On the other hand, if a rm is in the long leg
of anomalies, then the rm should respond by engaging in activities which trade cash
for equity ownership (e.g. repurchase of shares). In addition, at least since Miller
and Rock (1985), paying cash dividends can be viewed as a way for rm managers to
signal to market participants that the equity is underpriced. Hence, if a rm is in
the long leg of anomalies, then the rm should also be more likely to generally
engage in activities which pay cash for equity ownership (e.g. cash dividends).
Given the asset pricing results, we should expect the sentiment-enhanced strategy to
have a larger issuance spread than a simple anomaly strategy. Similarly, we should
expect the sentiment-impaired strategy to have a smaller issuance spread than a
simple anomaly strategy.
I use a monthly version of the composite issuance measure of Daniel and Tit-
man (2006) to investigate the relationship of sentiment, issuance, and anomalies. In
particular,
modied composite issuancet;t 1 = exp(log(MVt=MVt 1)  log(1 +Rt;t 1))  1 (6)
I then dene the monthly value weighted composite issuance of a portfolio by
weighing the individual monthly composite issuance by its market capitalization at
the beginning of the month. This is a natural measure to use to test the implications
46
of Hypothesis 2. In particular, hypothesis 2 implies that rms in the long leg of each
anomaly would have low modied composite issuance, while rms in the short leg of
each anomaly would have high modied composite issuance. In addition, hypothe-
sis 2 implies that the sentiment-enhanced anomaly long-short strategy should yield
signicantly higher spread in composite issuance than a simple anomaly long-short
strategy. In contrast, Hypothesis 2 also implies that the sentiment-impaired anomaly
long-short strategy should yield signicantly lower spread in composite issuance than
a simple anomaly long-short strategy.
Table 7 reports the relationship of nancial market anomalies with monthly value
weighted composite issuance. Previous literature has established that rms tend to
issue shares when the cost of equity is high as measured by the market-to-book ratio. I
control for this in a manner similar to the method Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, Wermers
(1997) use in controlling for rm characteristics in portfolio returns. In particular,
every month I assign each stock to one of the size quintile portfolios based on NYSE
breakpoints. Within each size quintile, I rank stocks in ascending order based on
market-to-book ratio. I then assign stocks to one of ve market-to-book quintiles
based on the ranking. I then calculate the monthly value weighted composite issuance
for each of the 25 portfolios. I then correct for size and market-to-book e¤ects by
subtracting from the monthly value weighted composite issuance of each stock to the
benchmark portfolio which matches the size and market to book ratio quintiles of
the stock. This benchmark adjusted value weighted composite issuance is reported
in Panel B while the raw measure is reported in Panel A.
Looking at Panel A, we see that rms in the long leg of each anomaly tend to
engage in activities which pay cash out of the rm, while rms in the short leg of each
anomaly tend to engage in activities which trade ownership of the rm for cash or
services. On average, rms in the long leg of each anomaly pay out 0.106% per month
47
Long Leg Short Leg
Financial Market Anomaly A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 L/S
Accrual -0.069 -0.151 -0.159 -0.089 0.092 -0.161
[-3.51] [-7.12] [-7.66] [-4.91] [3.05] [-5.59]
Asset Growth -0.19 -0.224 -0.17 -0.051 0.202 -0.392
[-7.44] [-13.57] [-8.41] [-2.77] [7.05] [-12.33]
Composite Equity Issues -0.434 -0.28 -0.085 0.065 0.157 -0.591
[-29.86] [-17.32] [-5.64] [3.65] [5.74] [-22.44]
Failure Probability -0.152 -0.114 -0.012 0.021 0.501 -0.653
[-8.19] [-5.69] [-0.46] [0.37] [9.67] [-12.95]
Gross Profitability -0.112 -0.144 -0.164 -0.141 0.042 -0.154
[-7.36] [-9.58] [-8.39] [-5.57] [1.38] [-5.36]
Investment To Assets Growth -0.166 -0.123 -0.193 -0.107 0.125 -0.29
[-8.87] [-6.25] [-11.68] [-4.76] [4.95] [-12.45]
Momentum (12/1/3) -0.036 -0.183 -0.21 -0.224 -0.035 -0.001
[-1.55] [-11.74] [-14.20] [-10.90] [-1.03] [-0.03]
Net Equity Issues -0.27 -0.19 -0.069 0.071 0.301 -0.571
[-20.38] [-11.17] [-3.90] [2.19] [6.80] [-13.67]
Net Operating Assets -0.006 -0.166 -0.158 -0.121 0.161 -0.167
[-0.25] [-7.61] [-8.91] [-4.56] [5.00] [-5.24]
Ohlson's O-Score -0.104 -0.16 -0.115 0.106 0.483 -0.587
[-5.68] [-4.77] [-4.59] [3.06] [10.38] [-13.13]
Return On Assets -0.072 -0.134 -0.108 0.023 0.324 -0.396
[-4.14] [-6.63] [-4.03] [0.48] [6.40] [-7.93]
Combination Of Anomalies -0.106 -0.139 -0.105 -0.007 0.285 -0.391
[-6.89] [-8.93] [-6.52] [-0.27] [10.05] [-17.82]
Table 7: Financial market anomalies and composite issuance
This table shows calendar time portfolio modified composite issuance. At the beginning of every calendar month, stocks 
are ranked and assigned to one of five quintile portfolios in a manner determined by previous studies and described in 
Section 2 and Section 3 of the main text. Daniel and Titman (2006) composite issuance is modified to a monthly 
measure analogous to monthly returns as follows: . 
All stocks are value weighted within a given portfolio, and the portfolios are rebalanced every calendar month to 
maintain value weights. In Panel B, modified composite issuance of each stock is adjusted by subtracting the value 
weighted modified composite issuance of a portfolio in the same size-market to book portfolio. This table includes all 
NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq stocks with non-missing anomaly variable information at portfolio formation. Modified composite 
issuance is in monthly percent,  t-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates and are based on the 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of White (1980). 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.





Long Leg Short Leg
Financial Market Anomaly A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 L/S
Accrual 0.029 -0.013 -0.032 0.007 0.122 -0.093
[1.95] [-1.09] [-2.75] [0.50] [5.48] [-3.29]
Asset Growth -0.109 -0.076 -0.032 0.047 0.227 -0.336
[-5.15] [-5.49] [-3.00] [3.43] [12.93] [-11.20]
Composite Equity Issues -0.195 -0.08 0.049 0.171 0.249 -0.444
[-17.41] [-7.47] [4.74] [14.14] [13.83] [-18.87]
Failure Probability -0.053 -0.007 0.083 0.055 0.329 -0.382
[-5.40] [-0.49] [4.60] [1.55] [8.15] [-8.97]
Gross Profitability -0.053 -0.057 -0.022 0.024 0.148 -0.201
[-5.61] [-3.45] [-1.52] [1.68] [7.74] [-8.65]
Investment To Assets Growth -0.051 -0.011 -0.047 0.006 0.164 -0.215
[-3.50] [-0.77] [-5.08] [0.48] [9.80] [-8.95]
Momentum (12/1/3) 0.093 -0.001 -0.017 -0.039 0.061 0.032
[6.19] [-0.07] [-1.63] [-2.96] [1.76] [0.82]
Net Equity Issues -0.124 -0.066 0.029 0.149 0.325 -0.449
[-11.16] [-4.66] [2.21] [8.17] [10.37] [-11.76]
Net Operating Assets 0.054 -0.066 -0.034 -0.007 0.204 -0.151
[2.79] [-4.20] [-3.36] [-0.46] [9.68] [-4.99]
Ohlson's O-Score -0.026 -0.039 -0.007 0.144 0.353 -0.379
[-3.05] [-1.87] [-0.36] [4.89] [9.68] [-9.95]
Return On Assets -0.022 -0.02 0.023 0.108 0.2 -0.222
[-2.44] [-1.44] [1.24] [3.65] [5.17] [-5.37]
Combination Of Anomalies -0.037 -0.034 -0.004 0.066 0.247 -0.284




Panel B: Size and market to book adjusted value weighted composite issuance
49
while rms in the short leg of each anomaly issues 0.285% per month in stocks. The
average issuance spread of 0.391% between the long leg and short leg of each anomaly
is economically and statistically signicant. This is consistent with our hypothesis
that the broad set of anomalies represent mispricings, and the rm takes advantage
of them by issuing stocks, repurchasing stocks, or paying dividends. As seen in Panel
B, correcting for size and market-to-book e¤ects do not change the results.
Table 8 reports the relationship of individual stock investor sentiment with monthly
value weighted composite issuance. Looking at Panel A, the rst row reports result
using 12 month average turnover as a measure of sentiment. We see that low senti-
ment stocks tend to engage in activities which pay cash out of the rm, while high
sentiment stocks tend to engage in activities which trade ownership of the rm for
cash or services. This result is robust across the earlier period of 1927-1959 and the
later period of 1960-2011. The forth row, which reports result using 3 year FL Flow,
is similar. In aggregate, the di¤erence in composite issuance between the high sen-
timent portfolio and the low sentiment portfolio ranges from 0.213% per month to
0.453% per month and are all statistically signicant.
Looking at Panel B, size and market-to-book adjusted result is fairly robust when
12 month average turnover is used as a measure of sentiment in the overall period and
also in each of the sub-period. However, the di¤erence in composite issuance between
low sentiment stocks and high sentiment stocks disappears when 3 year FL Flow is
used as a measure of sentiment. Although issuance activity slowly turns negative as we
move from the highest sentiment portfolio to the second lowest sentiment portfolio, the
lowest sentiment portfolio appears to buck this trend after benchmark adjustments.
These results largely support the idea that on average, high sentiment stocks engage

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 9A and Table 9B report the monthly value weighted composite issuance
of the sentiment-enhanced strategy, the sentiment-impaired strategy, and the corre-
sponding simple anomaly strategy when 12 month average turnover and 3 year FL
Flow are used as measures of individual stock investor sentiment respectively. This
is analogous to the results in Table 4A and 4B, only that monthly value weighted
composite issuance is reported instead of the value weighted monthly returns.
I rst look at the results for the equal weighted combination of anomalies when
12 month average turnover (3 year FL Flow) is used as a measure of individual stock
investor sentiment. First note that the long leg of the simple anomaly strategy pay
out 0.164% (0.095%) per month [t-statistics=9.86 (5.96)]. The short leg of the simple
anomaly strategy, on the other hand, on net issues 0.117% (0.307%) per month [t-
statistics=4.73 (9.85)]. The di¤erence of 0.281% (0.402%) per month is statistically
signicant [t-statistics=12.85 (14.83)] and translates to roughly 3.42% (4.93%) per
annum. Looking at Panel B, correcting for size and market to book does not alter this
result. In particular, the adjusted spread in composite issuance is 0.228% (0.298%)
per month and retains its statistical signicance [t-statistics=12.37 (13.18)]. This
is consistent with hypothesis 2, which implies that managers understand nancial
market anomalies and opportunistically trade equity for cash or services and vice
versa depending on the direction of the mispricing.
Now I turn to the sentiment-enhanced strategy. The long leg of the sentiment-
enhanced strategy, which represents the low sentiment conditioned long leg of the
anomalies, pays out 0.167% (0.018%) of the rm value per month [t-statistics=2.96
(0.69)]. On the other hand, the short leg of the strategy, which represents the high
sentiment conditioned short leg of the anomalies, issues 0.465% (0.517%) per month [t-
statistics=10.94 (12.01)]. The di¤erence of 0.632% (0.535%) [t-statistics=8.99 (12.19)]






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































strategy. The di¤erence of the di¤erence is also statistically signicant with t-statistics
of 5.29 (3.34).
The long leg of the sentiment-impaired strategy, which represents the high sen-
timent conditioned long leg of the anomalies, issue 0.097% (0.173%) per month [t-
statistics=3.47 (6.16)]. The short leg of the sentiment-impaired strategy, which repre-
sent the low sentiment conditioned short leg of the anomalies, issue 0.128% (0.336%)
per month [t-statistics=1.15 (7.24)]. The resulting di¤erence of 0.031% (0.163%) [t-
statistics=0.27 (3.39)] is signicantly lower than the di¤erence of 0.281% (0.402%) for
the simple anomaly strategy. This di¤erence of the di¤erence is statistically signicant
with t-statistics of 2.14 (5.27).
Taken together, the sentiment-enhanced strategy boasts an issuance spread of
0.632% (0.535%) per month while the sentiment-impaired strategy has an issuance
spread of 0.031% (0.163%) per month. The di¤erence of 0.601% (0.372%) is statis-
tically signicant at the 1% level with a t-statistics of 3.41 (5.09). Panel B of Table
9A and Table 9B report the results with size and market-to-book adjusted composite
issuance. All of the salient features described above are preserved when 12 month
average turnover is used as a measure of sentiment. For example, with size and
market-to-book adjusted composite measure, the sentiment-enhanced strategy has
an issuance spread of 0.635% per month while the sentiment-impaired strategy has
an issuance spread of 0.053% per month. The di¤erence of 0.707% per month is also
statistically signicant at the 1% level with a t-statistics of 3.87. However, when 3
year FL Flow is used as a measure of sentiment, the di¤erence in spread between the
sentiment-enhanced strategy and sentiment-impaired strategy narrows and become
statistically insignicant after correcting for size and market to book.
Now I turn to looking into the set of 11 anomalies on an individual basis when
12 month average turnover (3 year FL Flow) is used as a measure of sentiment. The
58
sentiment-enhanced strategy has a larger issuance spread than the simple anomaly
strategy in all 11 (10) anomalies. It is statistically signicant at the 5% level for 9 (6)
out of the 11 anomalies. On the other hand, the simple anomaly strategy has a larger
issuance spread than the sentiment-impaired strategy in 10 (11) of the 11 anomalies.
Of those, 9 (9) of the di¤erences are statistically signicant. Viewed together, the
sentiment-enhanced strategy has a larger and statistically signicant spread in 9 (10)
of the 11 anomalies. The remaining two have the correct sign.
These results are highly supportive of the very rened hypothesis that 1. Firms act
as rational arbitrageurs who take advantage of nancial market anomalies unearthed
by academics; and 2. Such arbitrage activities are concentrated in the low sentiment
portion of the long leg of anomalies and the high sentiment portion of the short leg of
anomalies. Recall that these patterns correspond exactly to the pattern of abnormal
returns reported in the earlier sections. In particular, abnormal excess returns on the
long side are concentrated in stocks with low individual stock investor sentiment. At
the same time, these are also the stocks which engage in the most repurchase and
cash disbursement activities. On the other hand, abnormal excess returns on the
short side are concentrated in stocks with high individual stock investor sentiment.
These are also the stocks which engage in the most issuance activities.
8 Conclusion
With limits to arbitrage, variation in individual stock investor sentiment may be an
important variable in determining cross sectional asset returns. This paper uses two
proxies for individual stock investor sentiment, 12 month average turnover and 3 year
FL Flow, and provides compelling evidence that this is the case. In particular, the
abnormal returns in a broad set of nancial market anomalies depends on the level of
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individual stock investor sentiment. To add to the mounting evidence that nancial
market anomalies represent mispricing instead of an unidentied risk factor, I iden-
tify the rm as a natural rational arbitrageur, and show that composite issuance is
high when rms are overpriced, while composite issuance is low when rms are un-
derpriced. This pattern of rm behavior is consistent with the rm taking advantage
of mispricing that occurs due to stock sentiment-induced demand shocks. Broadly
speaking, this paper provides a uniform view of how underreaction and overreaction
happens concurrently: investors have underreacted when individual stock investor
sentiment is low, and have overreacted when individual stock investor sentiment is
high. This paper clearly species likely variables that proxy for individual stock in-
vestor sentiment, and shows that individual stock investor sentiment can be high for
some stocks and low for other stocks simultaneously. With limits to arbitrage be-
ing more binding to the asset management industry, the rm emerges as a natural




I calculate mutual fund ows using the CRSP Mutual Fund Database and the Thom-
son Reuters Mutual Fund Ownership data (formerly known as the CDA S12 data).
I use the MFLINKS tables (developed by CRSP and Professor Russ Wermers) to
merge the CRSP Mutual Fund data with the Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Owner-
ship data. I focus on all domestic equity funds that exist at any date between 1Q1980
and 3Q2010 for which we can match CRSP data with the Thomson Reuters common
stock holding data.
There are multiple variables which allow me to screen for US equity funds in the
CRSP dataset. I use Policy Code, Wiesenberger Objective Codes, Strategic Insights
Objective Code, Lipper Objective Code, Lipper Classication Code and Lipper Asset
Code to screen for US equity funds. My approach is to rst use these codes to
eliminate funds which unequivocally specify a non-US or non-equity focus. After
this rst lter, I further distinguish funds which are labeled under more ambiguous
categories. A complete list of the categories of funds excluded and contingently
included can be found in Appendix Table 1. For example, we contingently include
balanced funds, asset allocation funds, and income funds. While some of these funds
hold primarily US equity, there is a signicant portion which holds primarily non-
equity assets. To tackle this problem, we further delete mutual funds which hold more
than 30% in non-equity holdings at any point in time17. In addition, I remove mutual
funds with fund names which specify a non-US or non-equity focus. I investigate
17I require that PER_PREF +PER_CONV +PER_CORP +PER_MUNI +PER_GOVT
+PER_OTH +PER_BOND > 30
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Code Excluded Contingently Included
Bond and preferred stocks (‘B&P’) Balanced Fund (‘Bal’)
Bonds (‘Bonds’) Common stocks (‘CS’)
Canadian and International (‘C&I’) Flexible strategy (‘Flex’)
Government securities (‘GS’) Leverage and/or short-selling (‘Hedge’)
Income fund (‘I-S’) Multi-manager fund (‘MF’)
Holds equity in lease contracts (‘Leases’) Sector or highly speculative fund (‘Spec’)
Money market fund (‘MM’)
Preferred stocks (‘Pfd’)
Tax-free fund (‘TF’)
Tax-free exchange fund (‘TFE’)
Tax-free money market fund (‘TFM’)
Corporate Bond (‘CBD’) Asset Allocation (‘AAL’)
Corporate high-yield bond  (‘CHY’) Balanced (‘BAL’)
Government securities (‘GOV’) Energy/Natural resources (‘ENR’)
Gold and precious metals (‘GPM’) Financial sector (‘FIN’)
International bond (‘IBD’) Growth and current income (‘GCI’)
International equity (‘INT’) Health Sector (‘HLT’)
Municipal bond (‘MBD’) Equity income (‘IEQ’)
Municipal high-yield (‘MHY’) Flexible income (‘IFL’)
Money market fund (‘MMF’) Long-term growth (‘LTG’)
Municipal single state (‘MSS’) Maximum capital gains (‘MCG’)
Government mortgage-backed (‘MTG’) Other (not classified) (‘OTH’)
Tax-free money market (‘TFM’) Small capitalization growth (‘SCG’)
Taxable money market (‘TMM’) Technology sector (‘TCH’)
Utilities (‘UTL’)
Equity  USA Aggressive Growth (‘AGG’)
Asset Allocation USA Balanced (‘BAL’)
Equity USA Environmental (‘ENV’)
Asset Allocation USA Principle Return (‘EPR’)
Equity  USA Financial Sector (‘FIN’)
Asset Allocation USA Flexible (‘FLX’)
Equity  USA Midcaps (‘GMC’)
Equity  USA Growth  & Income (‘GRI’)
Equity  USA Growth (‘GRO’)
Equity  USA Health (‘HLT’)
Equity  USA Income & Growth (‘ING’)
Equity Natural  Resources  & Energy (‘NTR’)
Equity  USA Real  Estate (‘RLE’)
Equity  USA Small  Companies (‘SCG’)
Equity  USA Technology (‘TEC’)
Equity  USA Utilities (‘UTI’)
Absolute-Return Funds (‘ABR’)
Balanced Funds (‘B’)
Basic Materials Funds (‘BM’)
Capital Appreciation Funds (‘CA’)
Consumer  Goods Funds (‘CG’)
Consumer Services Funds (‘CS’)
Equity Leverage Funds (‘DL’)
Dedicated Short Bias Funds (‘DSB’)
Equity Income Funds (‘EI’ and ‘EIEI’)
Extended U.S. Large-Cap Core Funds (‘ELCC’)
Equity Market Neutral Funds (‘EMN’)
Financial Services Funds (‘FS’)
Growth Funds (‘G’)




Large-Cap  Core Funds (‘LCCE’)
Strategic Insights Objective 
Code (1993-1998)
This table uses codes in the CRSP Mutual Fund Database to filter out funds that are likely non US-equity focused in nature. Funds that are contingently 
included are further screened using criteria laid out in the main text.
Appendix Table 1: 
The 174 categories of fund which are listed on p.27-p.29 of 
the CRSP Survivor-Biased-Free US Mutual Fund Database 
Guide which does not appear in the “Included” column to the 
left. These categories generally unequivocally specify a bond,  
international or commodities focus. 
The 143 categories of fund which are listed on p.16-p.26 of 
the CRSP Survivor-Biased-Free US Mutual Fund Database 
Guide which does not appear in the “Included” column to the 
left. These categories generally unequivocally specify a bond,  
international or commodities focus. 




Wiesenberger Objective Code 
(1980-1992)
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Code Excluded Contingently Included
Large-Cap  Growth Funds (‘LCGE’)
Large-Cap Value Funds (‘LCVE’)
Long/Short Equity Funds (‘LSE’)
Mixed-Asset Target Funds (‘MATA’, ‘MATB’, ‘MATC’,
 ‘MATD’,  ‘MATE’,  ‘MATF’, ‘MATG’, ‘MATH’, ‘MATI’)
Mixed-Asset Target Alloc Consv Funds (‘MTAC’)
Mixed-Asset Target Alloc Growth Funds (‘MTAG’)
Mixed-Asset Target Alloc Moderate Funds (‘MTAM’)
Mid-Cap Funds (‘MC’)
Mid-Cap Core Funds (‘MCCE’)
Mid-Cap Growth Funds (‘MCGE’)
Mid-Cap Value Funds (‘MCVE’)
Multi-Cap Core Funds (‘MLCE’)
Multi-Cap Growth Funds (‘MLGE’)
Multi-Cap Value Funds (‘MLVE’)
Micro-Cap Funds (‘MR’)
Natural Resources Funds (‘NR’)
Real Estate Funds (RE’)
Specialty/Miscellaneous Funds (‘S’)
Small-Cap  Core Funds (‘SCCE’)
Small-Cap  Growth Funds (‘SCGE’)
Small-Cap Value Funds (‘SCVE’)
Specialty Diversified Equity Funds (‘SESE’)
Small-Cap Funds (‘SG’)
S&P 500 Index Objective Funds (‘SP’ and ‘SPSP’)
Science  & Technology Funds (‘TK’)
Telecommunication Funds (‘TL’)
Utility Funds (‘UT’)
Taxable Fixed Income Funds (‘TX’) Equity Funds (‘EQ’)
Tax Free Fixed Income Funds (‘MB’)
Lipper Asset Code 
(12/31/1999 — )








I further check this list manually to ensure that all of these funds have a non-US
or non-equity focus. This process is non-redundant. For example, there is an equity
fund named Williamsburg Investment Trust: Government Street Mid-Cap Fund
(crsp_fundno 032458) which contains the string government in the context of a
name.
9.1.1 Calculating ows
FL Flows are calculated using fund returns and total net asset (TNA) monthly data
from CRSP. Of the universe of all domestic equity funds, I delete funds which have
never had a valid return and month-end TNA. I further delete funds which have
annually updated return and TNA value. I determine the rst month in which a
fund exists as the rst month which has valid month end TNA. Similarly, the last
month in which a fund exists is the last month in which a fund has a valid return
and month end TNA data. (This is done as CRSP often has empty entries before
a fund starts and after a fund dies). For any month in which a fund is alive (i.e.
between our start month and last month), if CRSP returns a TNA of 0, I set it to
equal 0.01, which is the second lowest TNA value in the CRSP data. CRSP often
returns missing TNA or missing return value during the lifetime of a funds existence.
If possible, I would use available information to deduce the missing value, assuming
that no inows or outows occur. For example, if TNA value is present for t-1,
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t 1. This is done so that we do not lose excessive data
points. If a fund is merged into another fund, I assume that the merge takes place
during the month immediately after the last month of a funds existence. Following
Frazzini et al. (2008), I compute ows for fund i in quarter t, Fit, as the dollar value







that inows and outows occur at the end of the quarter, and that existing investors
reinvest dividends and other distribution in the fund. If a merge of funds took place
at time t, I merge the lagged TNA and returns of the two funds to calculate ows.
Returns are merged by calculating the TNA-weighted returns of the two funds. I
assume that investors in the merged funds place their money in the surviving fund.
9.1.2 Constructing counterfactual ows
K-period counterfactual ows represent the amount each fund receives if they are
allocated a pro-rate share of the total dollar ow to the mutual fund sector between
date t-k and date t, with the proportion depending on TNA as of quarter t-k. Fol-
lowing this denition, funds that were newly created in the past k quarters have a
counterfactual ow of 0. I only consider funds that were alive between date t-k and
date t when computing k-period counterfactual ows. In particular, let Faggs be the
actual aggregate ows for all funds alive in quarter t, for all t-kst. TNAaggs be
the lagged actual aggregate TNA over those funds that exists in both month t-k and
month t. A funds counterfactual TNA can be calculated using:
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bF is = (TNAit k=TNAAggt k )F aggs (7)
Initial Condition- [TNAt k = TNAt k (8)
[TNA
i




s 1 + bF is for t  k + 1  s  t (9)
If a merge of funds took place between time t-k and t, I merge the lagged TNA
and returns of all funds that were merged into the surviving fund to calculate coun-
terfactual ows. Returns are again merged by calculating the TNA-weighted returns
of all merged funds. Finally, let xit be the total net asset of fund i in month t as a






The counterfactual under proportional ows is:
bxit = [TNAit=[TNAaggt (11)








The ownership that would have occurred with proportional ows into all funds





Then, for each stock j, the percent of the shares outstanding with mutual fund
ownership attributable to ows is:
FL FLOWjt = zjt   bzjt (14)
FL FLOWjt is the increase in mutual fund ownership in stock j that results from
actual dollar ow exceeding counterfactual dollar ow. Recall that counterfactual
dollar ow is the amount that would have own to portfolio managers if they received
ows proportionate to their TNA for the last k periods. This assumes that portfolio
managers do not alter their percent allocation of total assets to di¤erent stocks given
varying levels of dollar ows. This also assumes that stock prices are unchanged from
the buying (selling) demand of the mutual fund sector. I refer readers to the appendix
of Frazzini, Lamont for an additional numerical example.
9.2 Constructing Book Value
I follow Cohen, Polk, Vuolteenaho (2003) in dening book equity value. Book equity
value is used in I rst dene stockholders equity. Depending on availability, I use
stockholdersequity number reported by COMPUSTAT (item SEQ) or Moodys in
that order for stockholders equity. If neither one is available, I measure stockholders
equity as the book value of common equity (CEQ), plus the par value of preferred
stock (item PSTK). If common equity is not available, I compute stockholdersequity
as the book value of assets (item AT) minus total liabilities (item LT). Book equity
is dened as the stockholdersequity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes (item TXDB)
and investment tax credit (item ITCB; if available), plus postretirement benet assets
(item PRBA; if available), minus the book value of preferred stock. Depending on
availability, I use redemption (item PSTKRV), liquidation (PSTKL), or par value
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(item PSTK) in that order for the book value of preferred stock. Following Campbell,
Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008), I add 10% of the di¤erence between market and book
equity. For rms that still have negative values for book equity, I assign positive values
of $1 to ensure that they lie in the correct tail of the distrbution when market-to-book
or book-to-market ratios are formed and ranked in the cross section.
9.3 Calculating Distress Measures
I construct the distress measure following Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008). It
is the 12-month ahead probability of nancial failure estimated by a dynamic logit
model:
Distress   9:164  202:64NIMTAAV Gt;t 12 + 1:416TLMTAt
  7:129EXRETAV Gt;t 12 + 1:411SIGMAt;t 3
  0:045RSIZEt   2:132CASHMTAt + 0:075MBt
  0:058PRICEt (15)
where NIMTAAV G and EXRETAV G is a geometrically decreasing average of
NIMTA and EXRET:Setting  = 2 1=3;
NIMTAAV Gt;t 12  1  
3
1  12 (NIMTAt;t 3 + :::+ 
9NIMTAt 9;t 12) (16)
EXRETAV Gt;t 12  1  
1  12 (EXRETt;t 1 + :::+ 
11EXRETt 11;t 12) (17)
NIMTA is the net income (Compustat quarterly item NIQ) divided by the sum of
market equity and total liabilities (item LTQ).EXRET  log(1 + Rit)   log(1 +
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RS&P500;t) is the monthly log excess return on each rms equity relative to the S&P
500 index. Missing NIMTA and EXRET are replaced with the cross-sectional
mean in calculating NIMTAAV G and EXRETAV G. TLMTA is the ratio of to-








i;k is the annualized three-month
rolling sample standard deviation. SIGMA is treated as missing if there are less
than six nonzero observations over the three months in the rolling window. In this
case it is replaced with its cross-sectional mean. RSIZE is the relative size of each
rm measured as the log ratio of its market equity to that of the S&P 500 index.
CASHMTA is the ratio of cash and short-term investments (item CHEQ) divided
by the sum of market equity and total liabilities. MB is the market-to-book equity,
in which book equity is dened as in Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003) and de-
scribed above. Following Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008), I add 10% of the
di¤erence between market and book equity. For rms that still have negative values
for book equity, I assign positive values of $1 to ensure that the market-to-book ratios
for these rms are in the right tail of the distrbution. PRICE is each rms log price
per share. All explanatory variables are cross-sectionally winsorized above and below
the 5% level to eliminate outliers, except for PRICE, where the value is winsorized
above at $15.
I follow Ohlson (1980) to construct the O-score:
O-score   1:32  0:407 log(MKTASSET=CPI) + 6:03TLTA  1:43WCTA
+ 0:076CLCA  1:72OENEG  2:37NITA  1:83FUTL (18)
+ 0:285INTWO   0:521CHIN
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CPI is the consumer price index.MKTASSET is total liabilities (item LTQ)
plus market value of equity. TLTA is the leverage ratio dened as the book value of
debt (item DLCQ plus item DLTTQ) divided by MKTASSET . WCTA is working
capital (item ACTQ - item LCTQ) divided by MKTASSET . CLCA is current
liabilities (item LCTQ) divided by current assets (item ACTQ). OENEG is one if
total liabilities (item LTQ) exceeds total assets (item ATQ) and is zero otherwise.
NITA is net income (item NIQ) divided by assets, MKTASSET . FUTL is the
fund provided by operations (item PIQ) divided by liabilities (item LTQ). INTWO
is equal to one if net income (item NIQ) is negative for the last two years and zero
otherwise. CHIN is (NIt-NIt 1)/(jNItj+jNIt 1j), where NIt is net income (item
NIQ) for the most recent quarter.
9.4 CRSP delisting bias correction
I determine the last trading month of a stock to be the month where CRSP returns
a delisting code (DLSTCD) to be above 20018. There are two components to the
returns of the last month of trading. The rst component is the month-to-delist day
return- which is the return from the beginning of the month to the last day of trading.
The second component is the actual delisting return- the return from the post-delist
value and the last trading date.
CRSP treats delistings that occur on the last date of the month and in the middle
of the month di¤erently. I rst consider the case when the last trading date is not
the last date of the month. If both month-to-delist day return and delisting return
are available, then CRSP combines these two returns and codes this in the delisting
return eld (DLRET). CRSP identies both variables as present by coding Delisting
Payment Date eld (DLPDT) to be greater than the value in the Delisting Date eld
18A DLSTCD code below 200 indicates that the stock is still actively traded on the exchange.
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(DLSTDT). If the month-to-delist day return is available but not the delisting return,
then CRSP reports the month-to-delist day return in the delisting return column as
well (DLRET). CRSP identies this by coding the Delisting Payment Date eld
(DLPDT) to be less than or equal to the value in the Delisting Date eld (DLSTDT).
If both variables are not present, then this is coded as .A (-88.00), .P (-99.00), .S
(-55.00), or .T (-66.00).
Now I consider the case when the last trading date is the last date of the month.
In this case, the month-to-delist day return, if available, is reported in the Return
(RET) eld. The delisting return is reported in the Delisting Return eld (DLRET).
As the delisting return eld may or may not be equal to the delisting month return,
this may be a potential source of error when computing the last month of return for
a delisted stock. I have taken care to account for these CRSP issues when computing
delisting returns.
Following Shumway (1997) and Shumway and Warther (1999), I only estimate
the delisting month return of stocks which have CRSP delisting codes of 500-599.
Those are stocks which were dropped from an exchange due to poor performance. If
delisting month return is absent, I estimate the delisting month return by setting the
missing return to the average of the delisting month return of stocks with the same
delisting code19.
Since delistings usually occur in the middle of the month for most of the observa-
tions, I cannot separately estimate the month-to-delist day return and the delisting
return as they have been lumped together by CRSP. In observations where month-to-
delist day return is available but not the delisting return, I have made the assumption
that most of the observed average negative return occurs after the actual delisting.
19When estimating average delisting monthly return, I exclude the delisting return of
permno=74369, which shows a delisting return of 13767%. I also only include stocks with shrcd=10
or shrcd=11, exchcd=1,2,3,31,32,33.
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In these cases, the delisting month return is the month-to-delist day return reported
by CRSP plus the estimated delisting return. Note that in Shumway (1997) and
Shumway and Warther (1999), the objective was to estimate a single replacement
value for performance related delisting. At the time of their research, most delisting
returns were missing from CRSP. The sample of delisting returns they found formed
the basis of the sample now present in CRSP, and they assumed that the delisting re-
turns they couldnt nd should be -100% in calculating the single replacement value.
I do not incorporate this assumption as it basically assumes that stocks with missing



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Average Turnover (1 month) -0.005 0.079 -0.084 -0.381 -0.733 0.353 0.376 0.812 -0.437
[-0.06] [0.80] [-0.61] [-3.59] [-6.16] [2.22] [3.91] [8.29] [-3.30]
Average Turnover (3 months) 0.122 0.039 0.083 -0.256 -0.681 0.425 0.378 0.72 -0.342
[1.37] [0.40] [0.62] [-2.35] [-5.99] [2.78] [3.70] [7.71] [-2.73]
Average Turnover (6 months) 0.214 0.018 0.196 -0.206 -0.698 0.492 0.42 0.716 -0.296
[2.58] [0.18] [1.45] [-1.96] [-6.14] [3.28] [4.45] [7.37] [-2.49]
Average Turnover (9 months) 0.215 0.036 0.179 -0.16 -0.717 0.557 0.375 0.753 -0.378
[2.54] [0.36] [1.33] [-1.57] [-6.35] [3.79] [3.92] [7.62] [-3.00]
Average Turnover (12 months) 0.246 0.032 0.214 -0.105 -0.714 0.608 0.352 0.746 -0.395
[2.81] [0.32] [1.51] [-1.05] [-6.24] [4.25] [3.67] [7.49] [-3.16]
Average Turnover (24 months) 0.311 0.049 0.262 -0.036 -0.648 0.612 0.347 0.697 -0.35
[3.50] [0.48] [1.79] [-0.36] [-5.74] [4.41] [3.38] [7.26] [-2.74]
Average Turnover (36 months) 0.288 0.048 0.239 -0.042 -0.61 0.567 0.33 0.658 -0.328
[3.25] [0.47] [1.62] [-0.43] [-5.11] [3.89] [3.37] [6.83] [-2.73]
Average Turnover (60 months) 0.264 0.057 0.207 -0.019 -0.556 0.538 0.283 0.613 -0.33
[2.68] [0.56] [1.32] [-0.19] [-4.63] [3.48] [2.61] [6.52] [-2.50]





















Dollar Volume 0.202 0.15 0.052 -0.549 -0.462 -0.086 0.751 0.612 0.138
[2.18] [3.01] [0.75] [-4.75] [-7.08] [-1.09] [10.15] [9.53] [2.08]
Amihud Measure 1.035 0.14 0.894 0.718 -0.281 0.999 0.317 0.422 -0.105
[10.29] [2.66] [9.22] [6.63] [-3.90] [8.60] [3.70] [4.80] [-0.97]
Appendix Table 4: Combination of Anomalies return conditioned on differently specified Average Turnover and Other Liquidity 
Related Measures
This table reports calendar time portfolio abnormal returns. At the beginning of each calendar month, stocks are independently double sorted on the basis of each 
of the eleven anomaly measure and T-month average turnover, Amihud Measure, or Dollar Volume into 5x5 value weighted portfolios. All stocks are value 
weighted within a given portfolio, and the portfolios are rebalanced every calendar month to maintain value weights. This table includes all NYSE/AMEX stocks 
with non-missing sentiment and anomaly variable information at portfolio formation. Only the results for the Combination of Anomalies portfolio are reported. 
Alpha is the intercept on a regression of monthly excess return from the rolling strategy. The explanatory variables are the monthly returns from Fama and French 
(1993) mimicking portfolios. Low turnover (liquidity) represent the lowest 20% quintile in T-month average turnover (the liquidity measure). High turnover 
(liquidity) represent the highest 20% quintile in T-month average turnover (the liquidity measure). Long-Short is the alpha of a zero-cost portfolio that longs the 
long leg and shorts the short leg of the Combination of Anomalies strategy, with low turnover (liquidity) and high turnover (liquidity) separately reported. Start 
date of each strategy is as reported in table 4A while end date is December 2011. Returns and alphas are in monthly percent, t-statistics are shown below the 
coefficient estimates and are based on the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of White (1980). 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.
Long Leg Short Leg Long - Short
Long Leg Short Leg Long - Short
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Accrual 0.162 0.044 0.118 -0.115 -0.661 0.546 0.277 0.706 -0.429
[1.09] [0.30] [0.59] [-0.87] [-4.76] [2.97] [1.40] [4.17] [-1.78]
Asset Growth -0.079 -0.151 0.071 0.183 -0.427 0.61 -0.263 0.276 -0.539
[-0.56] [-1.06] [0.34] [1.21] [-3.01] [3.20] [-1.30] [1.74] [-2.27]
Composite Equity Issues 0.083 0.019 0.064 0.135 -0.537 0.671 -0.052 0.555 -0.607
[0.66] [0.13] [0.34] [0.81] [-4.03] [3.18] [-0.26] [3.25] [-2.40]
Failure Probability 0.441 0.131 0.31 -0.161 -1.24 1.079 0.603 1.372 -0.769
[3.46] [0.88] [1.51] [-0.83] [-5.10] [3.71] [2.62] [4.44] [-2.21]
Gross Profitability 0.418 0 0.418 -0.07 -0.456 0.386 0.488 0.456 0.031
[3.33] [0.00] [2.11] [-0.61] [-2.88] [1.96] [3.12] [2.42] [0.13]
Investment To Assets Growth 0.19 -0.13 0.32 0.079 -0.363 0.442 0.111 0.233 -0.122
[1.57] [-0.96] [1.70] [0.49] [-2.48] [2.16] [0.57] [1.37] [-0.50]
Momentum (12/1/3) 0.284 0.087 0.197 -0.528 -1.214 0.686 0.811 1.301 -0.489
[1.85] [0.58] [1.01] [-2.64] [-6.32] [3.39] [2.83] [5.04] [-1.74]
Net Equity Issues 0.144 0.13 0.013 -0.194 -0.717 0.523 0.338 0.847 -0.509
[1.41] [1.03] [0.08] [-1.48] [-5.10] [2.77] [2.08] [5.73] [-2.37]
Net Operating Assets 0.156 -0.073 0.229 -0.012 -0.718 0.706 0.168 0.645 -0.477
[1.45] [-0.48] [1.26] [-0.09] [-4.84] [3.62] [0.99] [3.83] [-2.06]
Ohlson's O-Score 0.158 -0.098 0.256 0.017 -0.884 0.902 0.141 0.786 -0.645
[1.02] [-0.72] [1.20] [0.10] [-3.52] [3.09] [0.59] [2.69] [-1.72]
Return On Assets 0.582 -0.004 0.586 -0.687 -1.003 0.316 1.268 0.999 0.269
[3.88] [-0.03] [2.55] [-3.95] [-5.72] [1.29] [5.59] [4.48] [0.85]
Combination Of Anomalies 0.255 0.004 0.251 -0.103 -0.72 0.617 0.358 0.724 -0.366
[2.96] [0.04] [1.79] [-1.02] [-6.32] [4.36] [3.72] [7.31] [-2.94]
Appendix Table 5: Anomalies return conditioned on low turnover and high turnover (skipping most recent month)
This table reports calendar time portfolio abnormal returns. At the beginning of each calendar month, stocks are independently double sorted on the basis of 
each of the eleven anomaly measure and 12 month average turnover that skips the most recent month into 5x5 value weighted portfolios. All stocks are 
value weighted within a given portfolio, and the portfolios are rebalanced every calendar month to maintain value weights. This table includes all 
NYSE/AMEX stocks with non-missing sentiment and anomaly variable information at portfolio formation. Alpha is the intercept on a regression of monthly 
excess return from the rolling strategy. The explanatory variables are the monthly returns from Fama and French (1993) mimicking portfolios. The long leg 
and short leg portfolios are as determined by previous studies, and represent the extreme quintile portfolios of different anomaly variables. Low turnover 
represent the lowest 20% quintile in 12 month average turnover. High turnover represent the highest 20% quintile in 12 month average turnover. Long-Short 
is the alpha of a zero-cost portfolio that longs the long leg and shorts the short leg of each strategy, with low turnover and high turnover separately 
reported. Start date of each strategy is as reported in table 4A while end date is December 2011. Returns and alphas are in monthly percent, t-statistics are 
shown below the coefficient estimates and are based on the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of White (1980). 5% statistical significance is 
indicated in bold.
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